Mapping SDG16+

The Evidence for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies

Discussion Paper

David Steven

November 2016



NYU CIC | CENTER ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies

Agenda 2030 states that "there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development."

The new agenda sets ambitious targets for tackling violence, insecurity and injustice, and for strengthening the governance and institutions that will underpin a more sustainable future.

SDG16 is the main goal for "fostering peaceful, just and inclusive societies which are free from fear and violence," but it has strong links with other goals, in line with the indivisible nature of Agenda 2030.

In all, 36 targets from seven other SDGs directly measure an aspect of peace, inclusion or access to justice, with only a third of these found in SDG16. We refer to this group of targets as SDG16+.

New York University's Center on International Cooperation, in association with the governments of Brazil and Switzerland, has been working with other UN member states, international organizations, global partnerships, and civil society and private sector actors to explore the challenge of delivering SDG16+.

Through high-level events, workshops, research and publications, we have highlighted the work of 'pathfinders' who are playing a leadership role in SDG16+ delivery, drawing on both national and international experience.

The Pathfinders for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies initiative is now beginning to explore strategic priorities for first phase of Agenda 2030 implementation, focusing on both delivery and data challenges.

CIC has produced two papers exploring data, trends, evidence and partnerships for the SDG16+ targets for peaceful just and inclusive societies.

- Mapping SDG16+ - The Indicators for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies
- Mapping SDG16+ - The Evidence for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies

These papers are circulated in draft for the *Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies* retreat at the Greentree Foundation on 16-17 November 2016.

Based on the outcomes of the retreat, these preliminary drafts will be revised. Comments and suggestions are welcome.

Key Findings

SDG16 is the main goal for "fostering peaceful, just and inclusive societies which are free from fear and violence," but it has strong links with other goals, in line with the indivisible nature of Agenda 2030.

In all, 36 targets from seven other SDGs *directly* measure an aspect of peace, inclusion or access to justice, with only a third of these found in SDG16.

The SDG16+ targets are supported by other targets in areas such as employment and growth, inequality, and resilience in the face of economic, social, and environmental shocks. These are all areas which contribute to the achievement of peace, or to a broader conception of a just and inclusive society.

The SDG16+ targets, in turn, provide the foundations for ensuring that "all human beings can fulfil their potential in dignity and equality."

They provide the institutions and enabling environment for sustained and inclusive growth, and they underpin the collective action that is urgently needed to reverse environmental degradation and protect the planet.

This paper maps evidence for peaceful, just and inclusive societies, offering an overview of the challenges presented by the SDG16+ targets. The aim is to clarify the nature of the task ahead and how partners can work together to tackle it.

The paper addresses the following questions:

- What data do we have to establish a baseline for the SDG16+ targets? What do we know about trends and can we use them to establish a business-as-usual trajectory?
- What evidence do we have for 'what works' to deliver peaceful, just and inclusive societies? How strong a foundation does this provide for effective delivery?
- How can the partnerships for peace, justice and inclusion be strengthened?

Ten conclusions are presented:

1. **Targets for peaceful, just and inclusive societies pose a daunting challenge.**

   The 36 SDG16+ targets are extremely stretching. There are few projections to 2030, but a substantial gap remains between the aspirations of the targets and business-as-usual trajectories. Scenarios should be constructed to clarify the scale of the task ahead.

2. **Evidence is improving for what works to deliver peaceful, just and inclusive societies.**

   Recent years have seen a substantial investment in understanding outcomes and impact from interventions that aim to prevent violence, promote access to justice, and strengthen institutions. Evidence is being translated into a format that can be used by policymakers and practitioners.

3. **The evidence base has significant limitations.**

   Evidence on the prevention of violence, conflict and human rights abuses is fragmented across multiple communities. For the rule of law and access to justice, the evidence of what works is limited. In governance, new approaches are only beginning to feed through to a research agenda.

4. **Evidence needs to be translated into an agenda for action.**

   Policymakers and practitioners need to make better use of evidence and data. The main priority is to gather evidence for what works at scale, with the aim of creating a virtuous circle where increasingly ambitious implementation leads to substantial strengthening of the evidence base.

5. **Priorities for delivery are needed to answer the question "where do we start?"**

   The following are presented for discussion:

   - **Peaceful societies**: (i) prevention for countries in conflict or at risk of conflict; (ii) tackling urban insecurity; (iii) implementation of international frameworks for preventing violence against women and children.
   - **Just societies**: (i) investment in evidence for access to justice and building a movement for justice; (ii) universal birth registration and the accurate recording of all deaths; (iii) a measurable reduction in illicit financial flows.
   - **Inclusive societies:** (i) an agenda for action for governance and institutions; (ii) reaching a consensus on migration policies as part of the global compact for migration and the comprehensive refugee response framework; (iii) developing concrete proposals for increasing women's participation and leadership.

6. **An integrated approach is needed for the delivery of the SDG16+ targets.**

   At present, implementation of SDG16 and related targets is fragmented. Integrated approaches are needed, given that most *solutions* can only be implemented through strategies that span sectors and maximize the use of scarce resources.

7. **A number of areas would benefit from a more integrated perspective.**

   These include mainstreaming a gender and rights perspective, making greater use of problem-solving approaches, and accelerating SDG16+ delivery by transforming norms, values and expectations.

8. **New types of partnership and alliance are needed.**

   Universality provides important opportunities for countries to work together in new ways and in new configurations. Leadership from cities and other subnational actors is essential to many SDG16+ priorities.

9. **Concerted action is needed to build momentum behind the delivery of SDG16+.**

   An action platform for SDG16+ would bring together interested stakeholders with the policy leverage, technical expertise and finance to bring coherence to delivery. It would help align its members' strategies, and identify opportunities and obstacles to implementation.

10. **Key partners should come together behind a roadmap that maximizes opportunities for delivery.**

    A roadmap would build consensus around strategic priorities for data, evidence generation, delivery and movement building, and strengthening coalitions and supporting delivery. It will help build political momentum for delivery, increase coherence across sectors, and deliver results at a scale that is in line with Agenda 2030's ambitions.

Peaceful Societies

Peaceful Societies

SDG16.1 promises to "significantly reduce all forms of violence and related deaths everywhere." Together with 14 complementary targets, it aims to quantify the Agenda 2030 vision of "a world free from fear and violence."

This is an outcome that is of fundamental importance to all people in all countries. It demands an integrated perspective across the spectrum of violence, abuse and exploitation, and multi-sectoral action to prevent violence and make societies safe for people to live in.

It also has broad political significance. Just as target 1.A – *halve absolute poverty* – became a headline deliverable for the MDGs, violence reduction has the potential to become a resonant dimension of Agenda 2030 – for policymakers, campaigners, and the general public.

This section:

- Sets out broad trends for the 15 targets for peaceful societies, showing that business-as-usual trajectories are far from being in line with the ambition of the SDG targets.
- Reviews evidence for what works to prevent violence, demonstrating that the evidence base is improving rapidly but remains fragmented between different communities.
- Identifies the strengths and weaknesses of 27 partnerships for peaceful societies, setting out priorities for strengthening partnerships over the next 3-5 years.



One ¦ Baseline and Trends

This section reviews available data for determining the baseline and trends for the SDG16+ targets for peaceful societies.[1] It aims to increase understanding of the scale of the task implied by these targets and demonstrates that, in most cases, substantial improvements will be needed to business-as-usual trajectories if Agenda 2030 commitments are to be met.

16.1 All forms of violence

- Intentional homicide (16.1.1)
- Conflict related deaths (16.1.2)
- Prevalence of physical, psychological or sexual violence (16.1.3)
- Perception of safety when walking alone (16.1.4)

During the MDG era, the world became more peaceful, supporting reductions in poverty and progress towards other goals.[2]

This trend has now reversed. According to the Small Arms Survey's (SAS) multi-source database on violent deaths, an average of 535,000 people have died from violence each year over the past five years, or roughly one per minute. While the slow decline in homicide has continued, this has been outweighed by an increase in conflict deaths, from an annual average of 55,000 in 2004-2009 to 90,000 in 2010-2015.[3] As a result, there has been a shift in the burden of lethal violence from homicide to conflict, although homicide continues to account for 80% of all violent deaths.

There are dramatic inequalities in the burden of violence, as "a decreasing number of countries account for a growing proportion of violent deaths."[4] In part, this is due to the concentration of conflict deaths, with 83,880 of these deaths occurring in just 15 countries. Rising levels of conflict are contributing to a widening gap between the world's most peaceful region (Europe) and its most insecure (the Middle East).[5] The Middle East has now surpassed Africa as the region with the highest levels of violent conflict, a trend that reflects increased violence in the former, but a decline in conflict in the latter.



But the risk of homicide is also highly unevenly distributed. Fewer than half of the world's 20 most violent countries are affected by conflict, reflecting extremely high levels of non-conflict violence, especially in urban centers.[6] High income countries have seen much faster declines in their murder rates than those with middle and low incomes.[7] As a result, the group of countries with low homicide rates is growing and is now home to more than four billion people. Just 10% of the global population, or around 700 million, live in countries with high homicide levels.[8]

There are substantial gaps in our knowledge of the non-lethal impacts of violence:

- **Most violence is unreported**. In the United States, fewer than half of violent victimizations are reported to the police, while only 42% of serious violent crimes (rape or sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault) are reported.[9] Non-lethal violence is largely a hidden problem in countries with weak institutions, an inadequate health system, and incomplete or non-existent survey data. In all countries, violence against women, children and the elderly is most likely to be unreported.[10]
- **Deaths represent only a fraction of the burden of violence.** For every homicide, hospitals are estimated to treat nearly 60 injuries that are the result of interpersonal violence.[11] But many injuries are reported and, according to the Global Status Report on Violence Prevention, "physical injuries… are outweighed by the wide spectrum of negative behavioral, cognitive, mental health, sexual and reproductive health problems, chronic diseases and social effects that arise from exposure to violence."[12]
- **The impact of conflict is largely indirect.** A review of 13 conflicts from the 1970s through to the 2000s finds that indirect deaths significantly outnumber direct fatalities in all conflicts but one, and continue long after the acute phase of the conflict is over.[13] It conservatively estimates that conflicts lead to four indirect deaths for every direct death, as a result of the collapse of basic services, and more long-term "destructive impact on the national economy and infrastructure (including health facilities), on social cohesion, and on psychological health and well-being."[14]

SDG16.1 aims to "significantly reduce all forms of violence and related death rates everywhere." Based on trends drawn from the SAS Violent Deaths database, we have constructed scenarios to 2030 that show the feasibility of meeting this target. These scenarios are provisional and are constructed using relatively crude assumptions, using historical trends to make projections for the future. The development of more sophisticated scenarios is recommended on page xx.

Under a **business-as-usual scenario,** the world would see a continued, but uneven, decline in the global homicide rate.[15] Due to population growth, however, the total number of homicides would increase slightly. Oceania, Asia, Europe and North America would see very low murder rates by 2030, with Africa's murder rate also having fallen significantly. Latin America, however, would see little respite from its very high levels of violence and its share of global homicides would increase to 43%.

The business-as-usual scenario assumes that conflict deaths would increase on the current trajectory from 2016-2020 and then stay constant. As a result, the world would see an 8% increase in the number deaths from all forms of violence between 2016 and 2030, at the same time as the rate of lethal violence declines by approximately 10%. Overall, the business-as-usual scenario is not consistent with the delivery of SDG16.1.

This scenario only takes into account direct deaths from violence. While it is plausible that non-conflict violence causes indirect deaths due to its impact on societies and economies, the scale of this damage has not been quantified. As discussed above, the indirect impacts of conflict have been estimated to be on a significantly greater scale that those of non-conflict violence.

Based on the rule of thumb that for every conflict death there were four deaths caused indirectly, we have prepared an **alternative baseline scenario** which includes nearly 360,000 indirect conflict deaths. In this scenario, conflict deaths account for 40% of all violent deaths in 2015, when compared to 17% when only direct deaths from conflict are included. This demonstrates the importance of considering the broader impacts of conflict when considering its share of overall violence.

A more **negative scenario** is plausible. The business-as-usual scenario assumes that Africa will see its homicide rate fall by almost 40% by 2030 - under this scenario, it's homicide rate will be five times lower than Latin America's by this date. But it is possible that non-conflict violence will increase in Africa, during a period when its urban population will grow by 63%.[16] Urbanization does not necessarily drive violence, but can do so when combined with weak governance, underemployment (especially for young men), high levels of inequality, and other factors such as a history of civil conflict.[17]

In the negative scenario, we assume a more violent future for Africa, with its homicide rate converging with the current rate in Latin America by 2050. This scenario also assumes a global increase in conflict deaths between 2016 and 2030. As a result:

- **The global violent death rate increases by 22% from 2016 to 2030.** This would have consequences beyond SDG16+. The MDGs were delivered in an era of growing peace. A sustained reversal of this trend would threaten large parts of Agenda 2030 and, in particular, the commitment to leaving no-one behind.
- **Africa experiences more than 125,000 additional homicides in 2030** when compared to the business-as-usual scenario.
- There are more than **an additional 70,000 conflict deaths** globally over the business-as-usual scenario, a pessimistic but not implausible outcome, given that conflict would still be significantly less violent than during the Cold War era.[18]

Once again, it should be underlined that this scenario makes broad assumptions, but it indicates significant uncertainties on future trends on the one hand and considerable risks on the other. Both these uncertainties and these risks need to be analyzed in greater detail.

There is an expert consensus that a more **positive scenario** can be delivered:

- The first Global Violence Reduction Conference concluded that, for interpersonal violence, "a global… reduction by 50% in the next 30 years is achievable if policy makers harness the power of scientific evidence on violence reduction."[19]
- The Igarapé Institute and Inter-American Development Bank have made a similar argument for Latin America, arguing that a 50% decline in violence could be achieved in just 10 years.[20]
- Manuel Eisner and co-authors have reviewed trends in interpersonal violence for 26 high income countries.[21] Between 1993 and 2012, 25 of these countries saw a decline in homicide rates, with

seven of the countries seeing rates decline by at least 50% and a further nine seeing rates decline by at least 25%.

- Based on the track record of 25 countries that saw at least a 30% decline in homicide rates between 2000 and 2012, the OECD argues that a rapid decline in violence is possible (though it underlines that while "halving the murder rate in any one of the countries most affected by violence is within historical precedent, to do so in most of them is not.").[22]
- Historical precedent would also support a reversal in the current spike in violent conflict, with a return to the lower levels of conflict seen just a decade ago.



These scenarios are based on partially disaggregated data for average deaths for 2007-2012 and 2010-2015 from the Small Arms Survey's multi-source database on violent deaths. The projections are based on global counts of conflict deaths and deaths caused by unintentional homicides and legal intervention killings.

Assumptions

- All scenarios assume that the number of deaths caused by unintentional homicides and legal interventions remains constant at 74,396 deaths, and regional homicide rates continue to increase or decrease at the same rate as the between 2007-2012 and 2010-2015.
- The business-as-usual scenario assumes regional homicide rates continue their current trajectories, while conflict deaths increase on the current trajectory from 2016-2020 and then stay constant.
- The negative scenario assumes that Africa's homicide rate converges with the current rate in Latin America between 2016 and 2050. Conflict is assumed to increase at a steady rate up to 2030.
- The positive scenario assumes a 25% cut in Latin America's homicide rate between 2015 and 2030. Under this scenario, conflict is also reduced, declining by 2030 to the rate seen in 2004-2009.

The positive scenario therefore assumes a 25% cut in Latin America's homicide rate between 2016 and 2030, with other regions following the same downward trajectory as the business-as-usual scenario. The scenario is based on the assumption that the most violent region has the greatest potential to reduce violence (and could be refined by an analysis that focuses on individual countries or even the most violent cities). Under this scenario, conflict is also reduced, declining by 2030 to the rate seen in 2004-2009. As a result:

- Latin America sees more than **40,000 fewer homicides** in 2030 than in a business-as-usual scenario, and its share of global homicide deaths decreases by 6%.
- **60,000 fewer lives** are lost due to conflict in 2030 than in a business-as-usual scenario.
- More than **100,000 lives are saved** in 2030 when compared to business-as-usual, or more than 300,000 lives when compared to the negative scenario.

16.2	**Violence against children** ▪ Physical punishment, psychological aggression by caregivers (16.2.1) ▪ Rate of human trafficking (16.2.2) ▪ Lifetime prevalence of sexual violence as a child (16.2.3)
5.2	**Violence against women and girls** ▪ All forms of intimate partner violence (5.2.1) ▪ Non-intimate partner sexual violence (5.2.2)
5.3	**Child marriage, female genital mutilation** ▪ Child marriage by 15 and 18 years (5.3.1) ▪ Lifetime prevalence of FGM (5.3.2)
8.7	**Child labor, child soldiers** ▪ Child labor (5-17 years) (8.7.1)

Worldwide, only about 7% of violence against women is formally reported,[23] while only 3.1% of child sexual abuse and 1.3% of physical abuse is reported.[24] In recent years, however, increased availability of survey data has allowed the production of global and regional estimates of the scale of the violence faced by women and children.

Women account for 17% of violent deaths or 66,000 deaths per year between 2004 and 2009.[25] In 2013, the World Health Organization, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, and South African Medical Research Council found that:[26]

- 30% of ever-partnered women have been exposed to physical or sexual violence by a partner at some point in their lives, while 7.2% of women had experienced non-partner sexual violence. 35.6% of women had experienced at least one of these forms of violence.
- 38% of all women who are murdered are killed by their partners. Data on non-fatal injuries from violence is sparse, but 42% of victims of intimate partner violence are thought to have been injured by their partners.

For children:

- UNICEF found that children and adolescents under the age of 20 accounted for almost one in five of all homicide victims in 2012, while one in ten girls of this age had experienced forced intercourse or sexual assault.[27] A third of children report being bullied in school, while 17% were exposed to severe physical punishment.
- Based on 38 surveys from 96 countries, a recent systematic review found that 64% of children aged 2-17 years experienced serious violence in the past year; 56% in North America, 50% in Africa, 34% in Latin America and 12% in Europe.[28]

- Others forms of abuse are also common. 700 million women are estimated to have been married before the age of 18 and 250 million before the age of 15.[29] More than 125 million girls and women have been victims of female genital mutilation (FGM) in 29 countries where the practice is most prevalent.[30] About one in ten children aged 5-17 years are child laborers.[31]

Women and children are most likely to suffer long-term impacts from violence. They "have more health problems, incur significantly higher health care costs, make more visits to health providers over their lifetimes and have more hospital stays (and longer duration of hospital stays) than those who have not experienced violence." Exposure to violence is associated with greater risk of mental and physical illness, of drug abuse and self-harm, and of further victimization, with half the world's children at risk of lifelong damage to their emotional, social and economic development.



Women and children are vulnerable to the direct impacts of conflict, although sex-disaggregated data is rarely available. They are subjected to abduction, rape, and forced marriage, often as a tactic of warfare. More women and children are dying in conflict, due to the increase in this form of violence.

Children are forcibly recruited into armed groups in at least 19 countries, with at least 6,500 children reported as recruited in 2015 (78% of these cases were verified). Each year, the Secretary-General submits to the Security Council a list of parties to conflict that recruit child soldiers. The number of listed countries has grown, although this partly reflects an increase in the number of 'grave violations'

that lead to listing. Nine parties to conflict have been de-listed having completed action plans to tackle their violations. 115,000 children associated with parties to conflict have been released since 2000.

The indirect impacts of conflict hit women and children hardest, due to their reliance on health, education, social protection and other public services. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, 3.9 million excess deaths are estimated to have occurred between 1998 and 2004, with children under five accounting for 47% of these deaths.[32] Less than 10% of these deaths were directly attributed to violence.

- **Rapid reductions in violence against children are also possible.** There is little evidence to demonstrate whether the prevalence of most forms of violence against children is increasing or decreasing at a global level. However, some countries have seen sharp declines. In the United States, for example, substantiated cases of child sexual and physical abuse fell by more than a half in 20 years, while cases of neglect fell by 14%.[33] In Sweden, the physical punishment of children has fallen from over 90%[34] in the 1960s to 3% in 2011.[35]
- **Some forms of violence against children are declining.** Globally, the percentage of young women married before the age of 18 fell from 31% to 26% between 2000 and 2015. However, despite falling rates, the total number of child marriages will still increase by 2030 due to population growth if the current decline remains constant.[36] In 2015, 37% of children aged 15 to 19 had undergone FGM compared to 51% in 1985.[37] At the current rate of decline, eradication of this practice would take around 50 years.
- **Shifting attitudes may be a leading indicator of changes in the prevalence of violence.** More than four in five countries with comparable data have seen a reduction in the proportion of men and women who believe wife-beating is acceptable.[38] Given that acceptance of violence is associated with higher rates of perpetration and victimization, this may be an indicator of the development of social and cultural norms that will protect women.[39] In Sweden, decline in public acceptance of physical punishment of children preceded the decline in this practice.[40] Data on declining public support for FGM[41] may also signal a switch away from these practices.

10.7 Safe migration
8.7 Forced labor, modern slavery and human trafficking

Globalization has led to increased mobility of people. Approximately one billion people are migrants: 244 million people are living outside the country of their birth; 740 people are internal migrants.[42] Many migrants fail to benefit from the Agenda 2030 commitment to the “safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people”, with most indicators showing a worsening trend:

- In 2015, 65.3 million people were forcibly displaced as a result of persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or human rights violations, an increase of 50% in five years.[43]
- In 2010, there were an estimated 50 million irregular migrants.[44] More recent estimates are not available and few countries other than the United States publish reliable data.[45] However, the evidence suggests that irregular migration is increasing.
- In 2015, at least 5,417 people died or went missing while migrating.[46]

- Migrants report lower levels of perceived safety and experience higher levels of crime than those born and living in the country to which they have moved.[47] The differences are most pronounced for newly arrived and South-South migrants.
- 21 million people are estimated to be victims of forced labor and modern slavery, of whom 5.5 million are children.[48]
- There is no global estimate of the scale of human trafficking (see *Mapping SDG16+ - The Indicators)*, but victims with 152 different citizenships have been discovered in 124 countries.[49]
- Despite a rapid growth in the criminalization of trafficking, only 16% of countries report more than 50 convictions between 2010 and 2012.[50]



16.4 **Arms flows**

16.a **International institutions to prevent violence, terrorism and crime**

In 2007-2012, 44.1% of violent deaths were caused by firearms,[51] while the evidence suggests that arms flows are "an exacerbating factor that drives conflict under pre-existing conditions of fragility."[52]

There are no credible estimates of the scale of illicit arms flows. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's Arms Transfers Database – considered to be the most comprehensive database on international arms flows – provides data on the volume of arms transfers between 1950 and 2015.[53] In the past 15 years, the volume of arms transfers has been growing after a declining trend between 1980 and 2000. Current volumes are similar to the levels at the end of the Cold War, with the flow of arms to the Middle East increasing by 61% between 2006-2010 and 2011-2015.[54]

In line with indicator 16.4.1, UNODC tracks the seizures of firearms.[55] Across 35 countries, 572,285 weapons were seized between 2010 and 2013. Over 70% of these seizures were in five countries (Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, Germany, and Iraq). Seizures are volatile from year to year. UNODC finds "a widespread lack of capacity to collect and analyze data on firearms seizures and trafficking… in developed and developing countries alike."

At a national level, small arms and light weapons surveys have been used to assess the distribution, use, and impact of weapons.[56] In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, a survey in 2010 found that 19.5% of citizens owned an illegal weapon, while a fifth of respondents reported being threatened with a firearm.[57]

SDG16.a calls for the strengthening of:

> *Relevant national institutions, including through international cooperation, for building capacity at all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.*[58]

There is evidence that interpersonal violence is a growing priority for international organizations.[59] Multilateral cooperation to tackle organized crime may also be increasing from a low base.[60] The multilateral response to terrorism has been described as "insufficient and uncoordinated."[61] At a national level, OHCHR has proposed the existence of independent national human rights institutions as a proxy for capacity to promote peaceful, just and inclusive societies.[62] The percentage of countries with these institutions in place has doubled globally from 16% to 36% between 2000 and 2015.[63]

11.7 **Safe public spaces**
- Physical/sexual harassment by place of occurrence (11.7.2)

4.a **Safe education facilities**

11.1 **Safe housing**

8.8 **Safe workplaces**

11.2 **Safe transport**

According to Gallup:

- Across 166 countries, an average of 60% of people feel safe when walking alone at night in the city or area where they live (data from 2006-2016).
- In 45 countries, fewer than half of people feel safe. In 38 countries, at least 75% of people feel safe.
- 48 countries have experienced a significant improvement (at least 10 percentage points) in perceptions of safety over the past decade and 25 have seen a significant deterioration.[64]

The European Union has surveyed physical and sexual harassment by place of occurrence in 28 member states. The most serious incidence of harassment was most likely to happen in the respondent's own home (27%), in the street or other public space (18%), at school or in the workplace (16%), or in another house or apartment (14%).[65]

Around 12% of boys and 10% of girls reported being bullied in school in Europe and North America.[66] According to the 2010-2012 Global School-based Student Health survey (GSHS), the number of children being bullied in the past month across 42 countries varied between 11% of boys and 15% of girls in Barbados, to 69% of boys and 79% of girls in Samoa.[67]

As both the GSHS and the Health Behavior in School-aged Children survey (HBSC) have been held repeatedly in some countries, there is some trend data available. According to HBSC data from 33 countries, the prevalence of bullying decreased over an eight year period between 2001/02 and 2009/10.[68] More recently, however, data from the 2013/14 HBSC survey indicated that the decrease has stalled as the results found no change in the prevalence of being bullied among children aged 11, 13 and 15 years.[69] In their review on interpersonal violence, Eisner and co-authors found a decline in bullying victimization in 23 of the 26 high income countries between 1997 and 2010. In five countries, levels fell by more than 50%.[70]

Thirty countries experienced a pattern of attacks on education facilities between 2009 and 2013.[71] The most recent *Education Under Attack* report shows an increase in the number of countries experiencing repeated attacks on schools, but finds that "it is difficult to know whether this represents an actual increase in incidence or whether increased attention to this issue among media, human rights groups, and humanitarian and development organizations since the publication of the last two studies, combined with improved access to local media sources via the internet, has simply resulted in the availability of more and better information."[72]

Findings

This section has demonstrated the gap between current trajectories on violence and the Agenda 2030 vision of achieving peaceful societies that are "free from fear and violence."[73]

1. Violence is a pervasive threat to sustainable development and must be tackled in all countries.

Much violence remains hidden, but the data we have leaves little doubt that building more peaceful societies is a universal challenge, with violence impacting the lives of very large numbers of people and affecting all countries. Someone dies from violence every minute. Violence is one of the top ten health threats in 28 countries.[74] It affects at least a third of the world's women and half of its children, and is a leading cause of death for young men, accounting for 14% of their deaths.[75] Estimates of the cost of violence are as high as 13.3% of world GDP and while methodologies for calculating costs are disputed, there is clear consensus that prevention is highly cost effective.[76]

2. Violence is a neglected dimension of inequality and is an important reason why countries and people are left behind.[77]

The burden of violence is highly unevenly distributed, both between and within countries. Violence is both a cause of and an outcome from poverty and exclusion. Within all countries, those most likely to be left behind by development are also those who experience the highest levels of violence, while the most violent countries are least likely to meet the targets set out in Agenda 2030. Countries with higher levels of violence experience higher losses in GDP and reduced economic growth,[78] while for countries affected by protracted civil wars, "an average of 14 years of peace is required to return to the growth paths prior to the conflict."[79]

3. Different forms of violence interact with each other and cannot be tackled in isolation.

Victims of violence "are at a higher risk for both being a victim of other forms of violence and for inflicting harm on others," while those who live in violent communities are more likely to be exposed to multiple forms of violence.[80] This is especially true in cities, where "various forms of violence most strikingly collide."[81] The boundaries between armed conflict, organized crime and terrorism are increasingly blurred, while "organized crime tends to thrive in transition contexts, from war to peace."[82] Gender-based violence is frequently used as a weapon of war[83] and conflict can have long-term effects on levels of interpersonal violence.[84] A better understanding is needed of shared risk and protective factors across multiple forms of violence,[85] and of how interrelated forms of violence can escalate in both conflict and non-conflict settings.[86]

4. The Agenda 2030 targets for peaceful societies will not be met on current trends.

The headline target for peaceful societies – SDG16.1 – might be met in some countries and possibly regions (those that are already most peaceful). Under a business-as-usual scenario, however, the number of violent deaths grows by 2030, as increased conflict and population growth outweigh modest falls in the homicide rate. A substantially more negative scenario is also plausible. We lack solid evidence on trends for non-lethal violence (also SDG16.1), and for violence against women and children (16.2, 5.2), for arms flows (16.4) and for international institutions to prevent violence, terrorism and crime (16.a). Child marriage and FGM (5.3) and child labor (8.7) show a positive trend, but not one strong enough for these practices to be eradicated. Migration is clearly becoming significantly less safe, while there is insufficient evidence on trends for modern slavery and human trafficking.

5. Policymakers need a better understanding of how far they need to 'bend the curve' to deliver the SDG16+ targets for peaceful societies.

There is a great deal of uncertainty surrounding projections to 2030. More detailed scenarios should therefore be constructed to demonstrate a range of outcomes against the key targets for peaceful societies, exploring likely trajectories depending on varied assumptions about the interaction between violence and key socioeconomic and attitudinal drivers. These scenarios would have immediate relevance and would inform strategies for the delivery of these targets at global, regional, and national levels, helping inform decisions about targeting, sequencing, and the use of scarce resources.

Two ¦ Mapping the Evidence

This section provides an overview of a growing body of evidence for what works to prevent violence. This is not a comprehensive review, but includes the main features across three domains of prevention: interpersonal violence, violent conflict, and gross violations of human rights.

Preventing Violence

The *World report on violence and health* described interpersonal violence as a 'preventable problem' and noted that, throughout history, societies had deployed a range of legal, cultural and other measures to control its spread.[87]

From the 1980s onwards, scientific approaches to violence prevention began to emerge. They aim to map the nature, scale and distribution of violence, identify risk and protective factors, design and test interventions, and implement the most cost effective at scale.[88] Research has come primarily from two fields: criminal justice and public health,[89] with the former usually characterized as being more reactive and the latter focusing on "changing the social, behavioral, and environmental factors that cause violence."[90] While these two approaches have sometimes been placed in opposition, there is significant convergence between models and results, with a recent review describing them as "interdependent components of a comprehensive strategy" for delivering the SDG16+ targets for preventing violence.[91]

Recent years have seen the continued growth of the evidence base and a greater proportion of studies published of violence prevention in middle and lower income settings.[92] There have also been increased efforts to synthesize evidence into a format that makes it accessible to policymakers and practitioners. WHO published a review of the evidence on violence prevention in 2010 and, with UNODC and UNDP, it published the first *Global Status Report on Violence Prevention* in 2014. This report "gives an assessment of violence prevention efforts globally and snapshot of these efforts by country," tracking the implementation of seven 'best buy' strategies and 18 prevention programs.[93]

These efforts have also focused on women, young people and children. For violence against women, the World Bank recently published a 'systematic review of systematic reviews of what works to prevent gender-based violence'.[94] In 2015, UN Women, alongside six other international organizations, developed *A Framework to Underpin Action to Prevent Violence against Women*. WHO has recently published a summary of the evidence of what works to prevent youth violence, while 10 partners, including UNICEF, WHO and the World Bank, have set out seven strategies for ending violence against children (published under the name INSPIRE). [95]

Given that they draw on an overlapping evidence base, it is unsurprising that these frameworks and strategies share many common features. The main elements are as follows:

- **Strengthening and enforcing laws to prevent and address violence,** including legislation on violence against women, children and elders, and laws and other interventions that aim to reduce access to guns and knives, and the misuse of alcohol and drugs.
- Interventions that aim to break **the cycle of violence in at-risk communities,** such as problem-oriented and hotspot policing, gang and street violence prevention programs, and behavioral programs for those involved in violence, or likely to become so.
- Support for the **victims of violence,** in particular to mitigate the consequences of exposure to violence through provision of health, social welfare and criminal justice services.

- Promotion of **safe spaces** through the upgrading of urban environments and action to improve the safety of streets and other public places.
- Interventions that promote non-violent and equitable **relationships** between men and women and that promote positive and non-violent **parenting practices,** as part of broader attempts to address **social and cultural factors** that increase the risk of violence.
- Investment in **quality education,** both within and outside schools, including life skills for children and young people, vocational skills for young adults who are out of work, and programs for men and women that promote dialogue on gender equality and norms that promote violence.
- **Economic strengthening**, including the economic empowerment of women, household economic strengthening for at-risk families, and action to increase the employment opportunities for at-risk youth.

This is still a nascent field. According to the Global Status Report, countries are beginning to increase their investments in evidence-based prevention interventions, but "not on a level commensurate with the scale and severity of the problem."[96] The new frameworks for preventing violence against women and against children are only beginning to be rolled out at national level. Some countries, especially in Latin America, have made a significant commitment to preventing youth violence, but a considerable gap remains between current practice and the disproportionate burden of violence that falls on young women and men.

A number of obstacles limit the uptake of more evidence-based approaches. Relatively few interventions are effectively evaluated (fewer than 7% according to a recent mapping exercise of citizen security programs in Latin America).[97] Support for implementation is weak, with a lack of evidence on whether and how proven interventions can be applied in different contexts and settings. Many proven or promising approaches are yet to be implemented at scale or integrated into a broader strategy that aims to achieve measurable reductions in violence at a population level.

At present, "the absence of reliable data makes it currently impossible to determine with any degree of confidence whether the dissemination of evidence-based approaches… has positive effects at the level of municipalities, states or across whole nations."[98] In other words, while the evidence base offers a place to start, we do not yet know with confidence whether it can deliver the reductions in violence envisaged by the SDG16+ targets for peaceful societies.

Prevention of Violent Conflict and Organized Violence

In recent years, "consensus has emerged at high policy levels around the basic elements of an approach to reduce armed violence."[99]

A milestone was the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) on conflict, security and development.[100] It set out a roadmap for breaking cycles of violence at the country level, based on the twin aims of restoring confidence and transforming the institutions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs.[101] The WDR argued that:

> *To break cycles of insecurity and reduce the risk of their recurrence, national reformers and their international partners need to build the legitimate institutions that can provide a sustained level of citizen security, justice, and jobs – offering a stake in society to groups that may otherwise*

receive more respect and recognition from engaging in armed violence than in lawful activities, and punishing infractions capably and fairly.[102]

The WDR drew on an analysis by Pritchett and de Weijer which concluded that the process of creating legitimate institutions could take a generation or more (discussed further on, page 50).[103] A twin track strategy was therefore proposed:

- In the short term, action should be taken to **restore confidence in collective action**, through a process by which countries mobilize 'inclusive-enough' coalitions to "build national support for change and signal an irreversible break with the past" through the delivery of results that demonstrate credibility.
- This would allow longer-term action to **transform institutions**, with priority given to reforms that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs, while stemming the illegal financing of armed groups. Other reforms should be "sequenced and paced over time, including political reform, decentralization, privatization, and shifting attitudes toward marginalized groups."

Consensus at a policy level is only beginning to translate into an agenda for action in conflict settings or in contexts where this is a significant risk of future conflict.[104] In part, this reflects the unique nature of each conflict. The WDR underlines the importance of nationally-owned strategies that respond to the nature of the threat a country faces, its institutional configuration, and its 'transition opportunity'. It offers "principles and options, not recipes" for a process of reform that must go through multiple phases and is likely to last a generation or more.

Even given this proviso, the evidence for what works to prevent conflict is fragmented and often inconclusive when examined at a more granular level. According to a review of research published between 2010 and 2015, there had been "some slight progress over the past five years in our understanding of conflict prevention and mitigation," but the evidence base remains weak.[105] Only 2% of the studies reviewed are both high-quality and demonstrated a positive impact (a further 6% of studies were of medium quality and demonstrated positive impact). While more studies showed a promising effect, a number of interventions had mixed or negative impacts, often due to a failure to respond to the political drivers of conflict, or because the intervention had a distorting effect on economic or political incentives. The evidence base is especially sparse for the Middle East and North Africa.

As with violence prevention, investment in conflict prevention is low when compared both to the costs of conflict and the resources spent on reacting to crisis. Approaches to prevention are fragmented, despite the need for a comprehensive agenda that brings together "the conflict prevention, disaster risk reduction, armed violence reduction, food security, and other related communities to establish a more comprehensive prevention agenda."[106]

But conflict prevention is rising up the political and policy agenda as new stresses increase the risks to peace and the growing complexity of conflict multiplies the prevention challenge.[107] The UN Secretary-General-designate has described prevention as "not only *a* priority, but *the* priority of everything we do."[108]

The Sustaining Peace resolutions, adopted by the UN General Assembly and Security Council, set out a vision for a 'comprehensive approach' to sustaining peace, that brings together conflict prevention, with

action to strengthen the rule of law, protect human rights, and promote good governance and accountable institutions. They also explicitly place this commitment to prevention within the context of broader action to promote "sustained and sustainable economic growth, poverty eradication, social development, [and] sustainable development."[109]

These resolutions reflect growing demand from UN member states for more effective approaches to conflict prevention and are fully in line with the Agenda 2030 recognition of the "major challenge to the achievement of durable peace and sustainable development in countries in conflict and post-conflict situations." Together, Agenda 2030 and Sustaining Peace provide an opportunity to make a new commitment to conflict prevention and to continued effort to strengthen and apply the evidence base.

Prevention of Human Rights Abuses

SDG16+ includes a number of targets that directly aim to prevent violent abuses of human rights, or that can only be delivered if these abuses are prevented.

There is a growing body of evidence for how some of the more serious human rights abuses might be prevented:

- **Torture** is mentioned explicitly in SDG16.2 (*all forms of violence against and torture of children*), but is covered by SDG16.1 and other targets as an extreme form of violence and the antithesis of a just society. In 2016, the first quantitative analysis was published of what works to prevent torture, drawing on the experience of 16 countries over a 30-year period.[110] Detention safeguards were found to have the greatest impact on preventing torture, with the investigation and prosecution of torturers and monitoring mechanisms also having a significant impact. Complaint mechanisms may have helped with individual cases, but did not have a measurable impact overall.[111] The analysis emphasized the gap between law and practice in most countries, and the importance of political backing for reform.[112]
- The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence has recently focused attention on measures to prevent the recurrence of **mass atrocities and other gross violations of human rights**.[113] His report discusses a serious of legal protections and institutional reforms, especially those that target marginalized communities, but also emphasizes the gap between law and practice. The report also proposes broader measures such as the enhancement of the role of civil society, interventions to address social and cultural norms, and the provision of trauma counselling and psychosocial support. While there is no quantitative analysis equivalent to that for torture prevention, there is evidence that external actors can help prevent mass atrocities, with a number of recent reviews exploring the most promising approaches.[114]
- Various violent abuses of the human rights of children are included in the SDG16+ targets. For **female genital mutilation,** the evidence base is limited, but there is some support for the impact of legal reforms, behavioral change programs at community level, and the use of mass media.[115] For **child labor,** the most effective strategies are "free, compulsory and quality education through to the minimum age of employment," combined with social protection systems that "prevent child labor from being used as a household survival."[116] For **child marriage**, five strategies have been evaluated, with the strongest results for interventions that foster "information, skills and networks for girls in combination with community mobilization."[117]

While the evidence presented above targets a single human rights abuse, recommended interventions are generally much broader. The response to a specific abuse (such as torture) can require reforms (in this case to security and justice institutions) that make a broader contribution to the work of building peaceful societies. The response to abuses of children's rights are compatible with the INSPIRE strategies for preventing all forms of violence against children, opening up the possibility of programs under the INSPIRE umbrella that target groups facing the greatest risk of FGM, trafficking, and child marriage. Strategies for preventing mass atrocities can similarly be integrated into a broader approach to preventing violent conflict.

Findings

This section has mapped a growing body of evidence for what works to prevent interpersonal violence, violent conflict, and serious human rights abuses.

1. **The evidence provides a foundation for countries to step up efforts to build peaceful societies.**
   Recent years have seen a substantial investment in understanding outcomes and impact from interventions that aim to prevent violence. Attempts have also been made to translate evidence into a format that can be used by policymakers and practitioners, especially for the prevention of interpersonal violence where the international community has reached consensus on the most effective evidence-based strategies. There is not, and cannot be, a 'recipe' that countries can follow, but governments have access to evidence and expertise that can inform a strategic approach to violence prevention that is in line with the Agenda 2030 commitment to *significantly reduce all forms of violence everywhere*.

2. **Delivery of the SDG16+ targets requires rapid scaling up of effective interventions.**
   There is an expert consensus that rapid reductions in violence can be achieved with sufficient commitment and resources, and "if policymakers harness the power of scientific evidence on violence reduction."[118] But this will require increased political will, additional resources, and a commitment to delivering policy preventions and programs at the scale needed to deliver measurable and sustained reductions in levels of violence. In the early years of the new agenda, leadership will be needed at national, city and local levels from 'pathfinders' who are prepared to implement ambitious and integrated strategies and to gather evidence to demonstrate their effectiveness in delivering one or more of the SDG16+ targets.

3. **Results must be demonstrated in areas where "rates of violence are highest and resources are lowest."**[119]
   Many forms of violence are highly concentrated. Delivery of the SDG targets requires early and effective action in both countries and communities where "rates of violence are highest and resources are lowest."[120] All countries must identify and target communities and groups that experience the highest levels of violence. At a global level, countries in conflict or at risk of conflict are clearly a priority, given the broader impacts of conflict and serious political instability of prospects for the delivery of all 17 SDGs. Urban violence is also a priority, given evidence that the most violent cities can cut violence by more than 50% in a decade.[121] New frameworks for preventing violence against women and children should also be piloted at scale, given the scale of the violence these groups face.

4. **Stronger partnerships are needed to deliver comprehensive prevention strategies at scale.** Sustained reductions in violence will only be achieved through multisectoral approaches that bring together government, civil society and the private sector, and actors working in health, education, criminal justice, social welfare and other sectors.[122] Integrated approaches are especially important for communities that are most affected by violence. They are deprived of justice and have access only to weak, and often abusive, institutions. Jobs and legitimate economic opportunities tend to be scarce. They also lack access to the health, education and social welfare services that would be expected to deliver interventions to prevent violence. A narrow 'criminal justice' response to violence has the potential to further marginalize these communities, with prevention strategies needing to be part of a broader attempt to foster just and inclusive societies.

5. **Delivery of Agenda 2030 requires ongoing investment in understanding prevention.** A comparative analysis is needed across the forms of prevention mapped in this paper (violence, conflict, human rights abuses). This will help inform more integrated and comprehensive approaches to implementation and inform an ongoing research agenda. For armed violence, there is consensus on the 'broad contours' of an approach, but much less understanding of how to translate this into an agenda for action. The evidence for interpersonal violence is skewed towards rich countries, although the balance is improving. Few interventions have been tested at scale in multiple settings. Evidence of what works is fragmented across multiple disciplines and communities.

Three ¦ Partners for Peaceful Societies

CIC's database of partnerships for SDG16+ currently includes 27 partnerships for peaceful societies. The majority of these have been launched after 2010, with six created in response to the new targets set out in Agenda 2030.

None of the partnerships cover all of the targets for peaceful societies. Some focus only on interpersonal violence (e.g. the Violence Prevention Alliance), while others are conflict-specific (the Geneva Peacebuilding Platform). Some partnerships focus on violence in particular settings (the Safe Cities and Safe Public Spaces Global Initiative) or on a target group (the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children). Many of the partnerships target a single form of violence, such as online sexual exploitation (WePROTECT), child marriage (Girls Not Brides), or modern slavery and trafficking (Alliance 8.7). Three major partnerships for knowledge development, violence against children, and the prevention of conflict are summarized below.

The Violence Prevention Alliance	Formed: 2004

"A network of WHO Member States, international agencies and civil society organizations working to prevent violence"

Objectives

- Increase collaboration and exchange of information on violence prevention.
- Advocate for the field of violence prevention.
- Mobilize resources and capacity for violence prevention.
- Set a research agenda for global violence prevention.

Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children	Formed: 2016

"Brings together stakeholders from across the world to end all forms of violence against children"

Objectives

- Build political will to achieve the SDGs and end violence against children, promoting evidence-based strategies.
- Accelerate action to tackle the violence that children face, with an initial focus on countries that wish to lead the movement to end violence.
- Strengthen collaboration among and between countries, civil society and other stakeholders.

Geneva Peacebuilding Platform	Formed: 2008

"An inter-agency network that connects the critical mass of peacebuilding actors, resources, and expertise in Geneva and worldwide"

Objectives

- Act as a 'knowledge hub' to advance new knowledge and understanding of peacebuilding.
- Facilitate the interaction on peacebuilding between different institutions and sectors.
- Develop a network of peacebuilding professionals and institutions.
- Provide policy-relevant advice and services.
- Ensure a continuous exchange of information, and necessary 'reality checks', through formal or informal seminars, consultations, and conferences.

The partnerships in this area have the following strengths:

- Strong **research networks** are in place for interpersonal violence, including the Violence Prevention Alliance, the Know Violence in Childhood global learning initiative, and the What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls Programme. WHO has a network of 12 collaborating centers for violence prevention from 9 countries,[123] while the Violence Prevention Evidence Base acts as a portal for evidence on effective interventions.
- **Networks of practitioners** are also being strengthened, ensuring that the international agenda on prevention is informed by practice in the field. The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform is a network of peacebuilding professionals and institutions. It is working to connect Geneva, New York and 'at risk' contexts and to "enlarge the 'prevention' community beyond its traditional focus on 'conflict prevention'."[124] Many professional networks operate 'below the radar' of the international community (such as the informal networks spreading best practice on evidence-based policing), but have the potential to play a greater role in the delivery of the SDG16+ targets for peaceful societies.
- **Delivery platforms** are beginning to emerge. For example, the Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children was launched in July 2016 and has the potential to drive updates of the new INSPIRE strategies for preventing and responding to violence against children. It could also act as an umbrella for the many partnerships and alliances that are working to make children safe, increasing effectiveness and strengthening advocacy.

There are, however, weaknesses:

- **Lack of a common strategy and roadmap.** There is considerable fragmentation between partnerships that work on different forms of violence and, as yet, no common vision or roadmap for how to deliver the SDG16+ targets for peaceful societies. The prevention frameworks for women and children, for example, have been developed in isolation, despite the fact that it will often make sense for countries to develop a joint strategy to tackle these forms of violence.
- **Urban and youth violence.** In some cases, delivery platforms will need to be strengthened for the task ahead. There are a number of city-based networks, for example, but none is currently of the scale needed to lead a 'big push' on urban violence. The prevention of youth violence is another gap (and one that has strong links with urban violence) that needs to be addressed if the targets are to be delivered.
- **Campaigning and advocacy.** While some partnerships are primarily focused on advocacy, there is not yet a unifying campaign, with global profile, to make the case for accelerated action to deliver the SDG targets for reducing violence. This is despite the potential for SDG16.1 – a signification reduction in all forms of violence everywhere – to become a headline deliverable for the SDGs, just like halving poverty was for the MDGs.

Over the next 3-5 years, partnerships for peaceful societies might work on the following priorities:

1. Unite all partners behind a compelling **case for action**, demonstrating why and how significant and sustained reductions can be achieved, for all forms of violence and in all countries.
2. Build a **case for investment** in systematic, sustained and large scale violence prevention strategies and identify how the most effective policies and interventions can be financed.

3. Identify and strengthen the most important **delivery platforms**, and increase links and coordination between these platforms to increase effectiveness.
4. Develop a strategy that will target **cities** (and communities within cities) that experience the highest levels of violence, focusing in particular on **young people**, and strengthen partnerships between mayors.
5. Develop a resonant **narrative and campaign** that will inspire a growing number actors to mobilize behind efforts to build more peaceful societies.

Just Societies

Just Societies

SDG16.3 promises to "promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all."

The rule of law is recognized by the UN as "a core principle of governance that ensures justice and fairness,"[125] while access to justice has been defined as the ability of all people to "seek and obtain a remedy, through the justice system, for grievances in accordance with human rights principles and standards."[126]

Justice is central to any conception of sustainable development. While SDG16.3 focuses on legal and justice systems and institutions, the 13 targets in the *just societies* cluster embody a broader conception of justice that is consistent with Agenda 2030's commitment to "a just, equitable, tolerant, open and socially inclusive world in which the needs of the most vulnerable are met."

Targets cover legal identity, economic empowerment, equal rights for women and other groups, and a range of non-discriminatory laws and policies. Critical transnational issues are included, such as illicit financial flows, while SDG16.5 covers "corruption and bribery in all their forms."

This section:

- Reviews data for the 13 targets for just societies, demonstrating widespread failures to provide equal access to justice and to protect human rights. Trends are usually hard to establish.
- Provides an overview of the limited evidence for what works to increase access to justice.
- Identifies the strengths and weaknesses of 20 partnerships for just societies.



One ¦ Baseline and Trends

This section sets out available data for determining the baseline for the SDG16+ targets for just societies.[127] Extremely limited evidence on trends is also reviewed.

16.3	**Rule of law and access to justice** ▪ Reporting of violent crime (16.3.1) ▪ Unsentenced detainees (16.3.2)
16.9	**Legal identity** ▪ Birth registration (16.9.1)

SDG16.3 aims to "promote the rule of law at the national and international levels and ensure equal access to justice for all," while SDG16.9 aims to "provide legal identity for all, including birth registration."

Two indicators have been proposed for this target, both of which focus on the criminal justice system:

- **Reporting of violent crime (16.3.1).** While the United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems collects data on the reporting of physical assault, baseline data is not yet available and only 24 countries currently provide data.[128]
- **Unsentenced detainees (16.3.2).** Globally, a quarter of those in prison are awaiting trial or sentencing, with a small reduction from 2003-2005 to 2012-2014.[129] Although the proportion of unsentenced detainees is declining slowly, the total number continues to grow.[130] 38% of prisoners in Africa and 40% of prisoners in Asia are unsentenced.[131]

Both indicators offer an important perspective on the rule of law. The reporting of violent crime highlights the role of the justice system in delivering targets for peaceful societies. The overuse of pre-trial detention "has a disproportionate impact on societies' most vulnerable and marginalized people who are more likely to come into conflict with the law, but who are less likely to be able to afford legal representation or the cost of release."[132]

But these indicators do not fully capture the concept of access to justice, necessitating the use of other data and evidence to establish the extent of the challenge posed by SDG16.3.

In 2008, the Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor found that most of humanity does not enjoy access to justice and is left "on the outside looking in, unable to count on the law's protection and unable to enter national, let alone global markets."[133] By extrapolating the results from 20 studies and applying these findings across 179 countries, the Commission estimated that at least four billion people are excluded from the rule of law.[134] This is only a rough estimate, however, and draws on studies that date back as far as two decades.

At a national level, the Commission finds that few comparative statistics are available.[135] However, it cites statistics that give some indication of the scale of the challenge. At the time of publication of the report, more than 20 million legal cases were pending in India, with only 11 judges for every million people. In Kenya, around one million cases are pending while in the Philippines, judges have a backlog of nearly 1,500 cases on average.[136]

Other indices provide additional insights:

- The Rule of Law Index provides evidence that access to *fair* justice is also a considerable issue, with "only 40 percent of low-income respondents who used the court system in the past three years report[ing] that the process was fair."[137]
- This index also provides insight into distribution of the burden of injustice by region – Western Europe and North America continue to top the WJP Rule of Law Index, followed by countries in the East Asia & Pacific region. On average, the South Asia region obtained the lowest scores.
- Similarly, the Worldwide Governance Indicators provide comparable data on rule of law for 200 countries and territories. At a global level, there have been no significant improvements between 2005 and 2015 and only a marked improvement for one region (Europe and Central Asia). However, this lack of a trend reflects the construction of the indicator, which holds the world average constant in any given year.[138]

Legal identity is critical to the rule of law and access to justice. As discussed in the *Mapping SDG16+ - The Indicators* paper, a majority of the data available on birth registration is drawn from survey data, but civil registration and vital statistics systems are improving. Existing data indicates that:

- Around one in three children aged five or younger are not registered, and UNICEF estimates that, "in 2012 alone, 57 million infants – four out of every ten babies delivered worldwide that year – were not registered with civil authorities."[139]
- Birth registration has marginally improved between 2000 and 2010 – increasing from 58% to 65%.[140] Average registration figures for 2010-2015 suggest that the trend continues to be positive, with 71% of children registered globally.[141]



16.4	**Illicit financial flows, stolen assets, organized crime** ▪ Inward and outward illicit financial flows (16.4.1)
16.5	**Corruption and bribery** ▪ Bribery of public officials (individuals) (16.5.1) ▪ Bribery of public officials (businesses) (16.5.2)

SDG16.4 targets illicit financial flows, stolen assets and organized crime, and SDG16.5 corruption and bribery. These targets have both national and transnational dimensions, reflecting increased interdependence and the need for collective action to confront the 'dark side' of globalization.

Illicit financial flows are widely believed to be increasing. Global Financial Integrity estimates flows from developing countries grew by 6.5% annually between 2004 and 2013, accounting for 4% of their GDP.[142] In 2013, these illicit financial outflows were an estimated US$1.1 trillion.[143] These figures are contested and there is no broadly agreed methodology for tracking these flows.

According to the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative, annual money laundering estimates vary significantly due to the different estimation models used:[144]

- Based on estimates of illegal and legal activities excluded from GDP across 21 OECD countries, Reuter and Truman cite US$3.4 trillion as an upper bound. However, they concede that, "at best, the various estimates suggest that there is substantial potential demand for money-laundering services, but there is little basis for concluding whether it amounts to hundreds of billions or trillions of US dollars."[145]
- Baker and co-authors estimate over US$1 trillion is lost globally through criminal activities ($500 billion), corrupt money (US$20 to US$40 billion) and tax evasion (US$500 billion) – half of which comes from developing and transition economies.
- An estimated US$148 billion or 25% of the GDP of African States is lost through "petty bribe-taking done [sic] by low level government officials to inflated public procurement contracts, kickbacks, and raiding the public treasury as part of public asset theft by political leaders" in Africa, according to the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre.[146]

A UNODC meta-analysis of studies looking at "the illicit financial flows emerging from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime and their socio-economic implications" found that in 2009:[147]

- "All criminal proceeds are likely to amount to some 3.6% of global GDP (2.3%-5.5%), equivalent to about US$2.1 trillion."
- Around US$1.6 trillion or 2.7% of the global GDP is estimated to be laundered through the financial system.
- Proceeds from drug trafficking and other transnational organized crime activities were estimated to be around 1.5% of global GDP or US$870 billion. Half of these proceeds come from drug trafficking, which accounts for 0.6% to 0.9% of global GDP.

There is more data available on the experience of corruption, however existing indices apply different measures and are not directly comparable:

- Recent data for the proposed indicator for SDG16.5 on individual experience of corruption are only available for 21 countries.[148] No trend data is available.
- Transparency International publishes the Global Corruption Barometer that draws on international survey data. In 2013, they asked 114,000 respondents in 107 countries about their experiences with bribery.[149] They found that 27% of people globally had paid a bribe when interacting with key public institutions and services in the past year. The previous 2010/2011 Global Corruption Barometer reported a similar result (26%). Based on this data, UNODC concluded that "the burden of bribery on low-income countries is heavy, though a slight decrease [for these countries] between 2011 and 2013 should be viewed as a positive development."[150]
- The IFC/World Bank Enterprise Survey "capture the prevalence of different types of bribery in 139 countries…based on surveys of more than 125,000 firms."[151] Of these firms, 17.9% of have experienced at least one bribe payment request.
- The V-Dem Public Sector Corruption Index uses six indicators to measure different forms of corruption based on input from country experts.[152] Having collected data for all countries from 1900 to 2012, they are able to provide trend data. Their assessment shows that corruption levels have increased significantly since the 1960s, peaking in 2000. Since then, there has been a slight decline.



8.5	**Equal pay for work of equal value** ▪ Earnings of female and male employees (8.5.1) ▪ Unemployment rate (by sex, persons with disabilities) (8.5.2)
8.8	**Labor rights** ▪ National compliance with labor rights (8.8.2)

Worldwide, women have fewer chances to participate in the labor market than men, and "continue to face a persistent gender wage gap."[153] They also continue to be more at risk of unemployment than men, although the unemployment gap varies across regions.

- Globally, women earn 77% of men's wages, even when hourly wage rates are taken into consideration.
- Based on data for 37 countries and territories, there are signs of progress with the average gap declining from 21.7% to 19.8%. However, at this rate, equal pay would not be achieved before 2086.
- In 2020, 865 million women are expected to live outside the formal economic system, with 94% of them living in low and middle income countries.[154]
- In 2015, an estimated 6.2% of women were unemployed compared to 5.5% of men.[155]

Less is known about unemployment levels faced by persons with disabilities as, "the disaggregation by disability is not widely available. It is increasingly reported but coverage is still very low."[156] According to a 2011 EU Labor force survey, the unemployment rate for people with basic activity difficulties was 2.5 percentage points higher than people without difficulties. For people with a longstanding health problem and/or a basic activity difficulty, there was a difference of 8 percentage points.[157]

The ITUC Global Rights Index provides an assessment of the protection of worker's rights – ranking 141 countries against 97 indicators, "derived from ILO Conventions and jurisprudence and represents violations of workers' rights in law and in practice."[158] Published annually since 2014, the index aims to track global trends over time.[159]

- In 2016, 58% of countries exclude workers from labor law, and 57% deny workers collective bargaining, while workers have no right to strike in 68% of countries.[160]
- Between 2015 and 2016, there was an increase in the number of countries which expose workers to physical violence (from 36 to 52), and which deny or constrain free speech and freedom of assembly (from 41 to 50).
- European and Central Asian countries provide the best protection of workers' trade union rights but are also the regions experiencing the "the starkest deterioration of those rights."[161]

10.3	**Equal opportunity laws, policies and practices** ▪ Individual experience of discrimination (10.3.1)
10.4	**Policies for greater equality**
16.b	**Non-discriminatory laws and policies** ▪ Individual experience of discrimination (16.b.1)
5.c	**Policies and legislation for gender equality**

	▪ Budget allocations for gender equality (5.c.1)
5.1	**Discrimination against women and girls** ▪ Legal frameworks for non-discrimination on the basis of sex (5.1.1)
4.5	**All forms of discrimination in education** ▪ Parity indices (for all education indicators) (4.5.1)

The Human Rights Scores website provides raw data on human rights variables compiled from a range of sources including the CIRI Human Rights Data Project, the Political Terror Scale, the III Treatment and Torture Data Collection, and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

Analysis of these indicators over time suggest that scores on these variables have not improved over the past 35 years. However, this perceived stagnation "reflects a systematic change in the way monitors, like Amnesty International and the US State Department, encounter and interpret information about abuses."[162] If the changes in monitoring standards over time are accounted for, a clear positive trend in human rights practices can be observed since the 1970s.

A number of opinion surveys measure individual experiences of discrimination, but comparable data is limited.

- The European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey found that between 12 to 50% of respondents – depending on ethnic group – reported experiencing some form of discrimination in the past year based on their immigrant or ethnic minority background.[163]
- The 2015 Eurobarometer found that 21% of all respondents said they had personally been discriminated against or harassed based on their age, gender, ethnic origin, religion or beliefs, disability, sexual orientation or gender identity. This is an increase of 5% compared with 2012.[164]

Data is fragmented for gender equality and discrimination:

- Around 4% of EU citizens say they have personally been discriminated against based on their gender in 2015, while 37% felt that gender discrimination was widespread in their country.[165]
- Globally, UNDP reports some improvements in gender equality between 1995 and 2014, especially in women's participation in political decision-making and in administrative and managerial positions in the workforce.[166] Women, however, face continued discrimination in "economic, political and social structures as well as policies, institutions and strategies."
- 35 countries report on indicators to monitor the implementation of the Busan Partnership Agreement commitments and actions,[167] with 12 having systems in place to track and make public resource allocations for gender equality and women's empowerment. Five have a system in place but do not make the allocations public.[168]

The World Bank Group *Women, Business and the Law* "measures legal and regulatory barriers to women's entrepreneurship and employment in 173 economies."[169] In 2016, it found that:

- 155 of the 173 countries have at least one law impeding women's economic opportunities, with women facing gender-based job restrictions in 100 countries.

- Although 94 reforms to increase women's economic opportunities have been implemented in 65 economies over the past two years, there has been no change in the proportion of countries (90%) with at least one legal impediment in place.

SDG4.5 targets all forms of discrimination in education. The 2016 Global Education Monitoring Report provides average parity index values based on data from 82 low and middle income countries gathered between 2008-2014:[170]

- Of the three parity indices – gender, location and wealth – wealth is the most extreme. "In upper middle income countries, the wealth parity index of the completion rate equals 0.90 in primary education, 0.71 in lower secondary and 0.44 in upper secondary. In low income countries, the wealth parity index equals 0.36 in primary education, 0.19 in lower secondary and just 0.07 in upper secondary."[171]
- Globally, gender disparity is the least severe of the three. However, this varies significantly between regions.
- There has been some progress in certain regions. For example, wealth disparity decreased considerably in Southern Asia between 2000 and 2010, but very little progress was made in Sub-Saharan Africa.



4.7 Education on human rights and gender equality

- Mainstreaming of gender equality and human rights education (4.7.1)

There is limited data currently available on the mainstreaming of gender equality and human rights education, but UNESCO reports some progress in this area.[172] The International Civic and Citizenship Education Study provides some data on whether countries emphasize human rights as a topic in their respective national curricula for civic and citizenship education. Of the 38 participating countries, 25 have a major emphasis on human rights, and another 10 place some emphasis on the topic.[173]

Findings

This section has demonstrated the gap between current trajectories on violence and the Agenda 2030 vision of "a just, equitable, tolerant, open and socially inclusive world in which the needs of the most vulnerable are met."[174]

1. **Data is sparse for the SDG16+ targets for just societies.**

   Little data is available to build a comprehensive picture of levels of access to justice. The proposed indicators (reporting of violent crime and the prevalence of pre-trial detention) offer important insights into the functioning of justice systems, but are not comprehensive in scope. Ongoing work is needed to define the concept of access to justice and to improve measurement techniques. This is important given the centrality of justice to Agenda 2030.

2. **Large numbers of people are deprived of access to justice.**

   While it is hard to precisely quantify legal exclusion, injustice, discrimination and the denial of rights is widespread. In some countries, the rule of law is too weak to allow for any meaningful progress on the SDGs. In many countries, significant proportions of the population lack legal identity, are unable to gain access to meaningful legal protections and safeguards, or believe that the justice system is unfair.[175] The rule of law and access to justice are a priority for Agenda 2030 "as important outcomes in their own right, as well as being essential precursors for development."[176]

3. **Corruption and illicit financial flows undermine trust in governments and hinder development.**

   Levels of corruptions are high and are a major source of distrust in many countries, with a quarter of people saying that they had been forced to pay a bribe to a public servant in the last year. The scale of illicit financial flows undermines the development prospects of the most vulnerable countries. A reduction in these flows could provide an important source of finance for Agenda 2030. More broadly, improved rule of law could deliver a significant boost to development, with researchers beginning to quantify the scale of these potential benefits.[177]

4. **Human rights and gender equality are fundamental to a just society.**

   Agenda 2030 sets out a vision for justice that goes beyond legal institutions systems, making a commitment to "justice, equality and non-discrimination" and to "a world in which every woman and girl enjoys full gender equality and all legal, social and economic barriers to their empowerment have been removed." The SDG16+ *justice* cluster includes targets that have the potential to mainstream rights and gender equality into sustainable development. Available data demonstrates the scale of the task in making this promise a reality.

5. **The Agenda 2030 targets for just societies will not be met on current trends.**

   We have little data to establish whether societies are becoming more just. There are very modest improvements for some targets and indicators, but not at a rate that is consistent with the commitments made in the SDG16+ targets for just societies. Unprecedented improvements in data quality and availability are needed to set a baseline for these targets. Even in the best-case scenario, this task is likely to take at least five years. In the meantime, the 'best available' data and evidence must be compiled and used to inform debate about delivery priorities.

Two ¦ Mapping the Evidence

This section provides an overview of a growing body of evidence for what works to make societies more just. It takes a 'people-centered' view of access to justice, before looking at two major sources of injustice: corruption and illicit financial flows. The review also brings together evidence on discrimination and gender equity, complementing the discussion of violent abuses of human rights in the *peaceful societies* section.

Access to Justice and Legal Identity

In 2008, the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor argued that poverty could only be eliminated through a radical shift by governments and international institutions towards strengthening the legal and institutional frameworks needed to support greater equality of opportunity and outcomes.[178] It reported "compelling evidence that when poor people are accorded the protections of the rule of law, they can prosper."

The Governance and Social Development Resource Centre, a research partnership, has argued that effective approaches to increasing justice are rooted in a 'people-centered approach' that is driven by an understanding of how citizens experience injustice and of the roles and motivations of the national, local and non-state actors who provide justice. It highlights five key principles for legal empowerment efforts that are drawn from Maru's experience in delivering 'second generation' justice services in Sri Lanka:[179]

- Offer concrete solutions to instances of injustice, solving everyday problems and "demonstrate[ing], case by case, that even in environments accustomed to arbitrariness and unfairness, justice is possible."
- Combine constructive and cost effective grassroots tools with "sparing, strategic use of litigation and high level advocacy."
- Take a pragmatic approach to formal and informal legal systems, "building bridges between them, and… advocating for the positive evolution of each."
- Empower people, by working with them to identify and jointly solve problems.
- Balance rights and responsibilities, "by supporting community and self-help organizations and by advocating as often and as strenuously for fulfillment of citizen obligation as for insistence on citizen rights."

There is, however, limited evidence for what works in this area. The rule of law field has been criticized for "a lack of knowledge at many levels of conception, operation, and evaluation."[180] The evidence base for justice programming is "generally weak" with "little in the way of rigorous evaluation on the effects of institutional reform programs on the effects of institutional reform programs on security and just programs."[181] The UK Department for International Development finds "a limited body of evidence for exploring how the rule of law emerges and is consolidated… [and also] also limited evidence on how the rule of law can be improved through concerted domestic and/or international intervention."[182]

There are relatively few evaluations of past policies or programming. A recent literature review found just seven quality impact evaluations for rule of law interventions in developing countries (with not dissimilar numbers available for developed countries).[183] It called for urgent action to supplement what it described as a "meager knowledge base." In its review of strategies needed to address judicial

corruption, UNDP reaches a similar conclusion. It identifies the need for improved evidence on three levels:

- Risk assessments that provide 'actionable' findings that inform the design and implementation of measures to counter judicial corruption.
- Robust evaluations to strengthen the evidence base for which judicial reform initiatives have the greatest impact on strengthening judicial integrity.
- Improved tools to assess whether judicial systems are improving over time.

There have been stronger political incentives to research the effectiveness of interventions to reduce crime, accompanied by a rapid increase in the use of evidence by police forces.[184] This evidence base is heavily skewed towards Anglophone developed countries. A systematic review of legitimacy in policing, for example, includes studies from only the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom.[185] A review of problem-oriented policing found only ten studies that met its criteria for inclusion, all of which were from the US or the UK.[186] However, proven and promising practices are spreading internationally, aided by networks of criminal justice practitioners and researchers.[187]

Civil society is increasingly active in promoting legal empowerment. A recent review found 199 studies with reasonable coverage for all regions apart from the Middle East.[188] Most studies are qualitative and there are relatively few robust evaluations. The review identifies the need for further research to explore how grassroots empowerment efforts can lead to broader institutional changes and for longitudinal studies that capture medium and longer term impacts.

Researchers are just beginning to explore the affordability of legal services outside developed countries. A recent study includes case studies from 12 low and middle income countries and estimates the cost of scaling up basic provision as between $0.1 and $1.3 per capita.[189] While this range of costs is "affordable in general terms in non-OECD countries, governments may be constrained in their ability to finance them." It sets out a range of funding options that could supplement government finance.

Birth registration is discussed in detail in CIC's *Mapping SDG16+ - The Indicators* paper, where the delivery of universal civil registration and vital statistics systems are proposed as one of four overarching priorities for an SDG16+ data strategy.[190] The foundations for delivery of this priority are in place: an emerging consensus on what works; a globally-agreed Roadmap for Health Measurement and Accountability which includes registration systems as an essential source of quality data; a plan for scaling up investment; and well-resourced delivery partnerships.

For legal identity, ID2020 has initiated "a global conversation and… working coalition to identify and build the enabling conditions for the creation of a legal digital identity for all individuals [without identification]."[191] This could provide the basis for an agenda for action that complements work on birth registration.

Illicit Financial Flows, Corruption and Bribery

Recent years have seen an increasing focus on illicit financial flows, with the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa citing evidence that the region would have met the child mortality MDG by 2016 if illicit flows had been stemmed, 13 years faster than expected at current rates of progress.[192] The focus on illicit flows has also led to increased attention on the role of elites in driving 'grand' corruption

(as opposed to the administrative corruption driven by mid and lower level officials)[193] and to the central role that illicit flows play in globalization.[194]

The Anti-Corruption Summit in 2016 included commitments on beneficial ownership, money laundering, public contracting, fiscal transparency, tax evasion and other means of uncovering and punishing large scale corruption.[195] It recognized the need for better integration between national and global efforts to challenge large-scale corruption.

UNODC and the OECD have proposed five 'policy considerations' for a coherent approach to tackling illicit financial flows:[196]

- Bring together multiple sectors and actors "to design and implement different (albeit mutually reinforcing) policies and actions at different levels of government," including a strong role for the financial sector, private companies and civil society.
- Use a shared analysis of the types, magnitudes and risks of IFFs and of the factors that facilitate their flows, to raise awareness and drive debate at the political and policy levels.
- Build political commitment and leadership from the highest levels downwards.
- Align national efforts with international standards, frameworks and mechanisms, and strengthen bilateral cooperation "in particular with countries which are key sources and destinations of IFFs."
- Strengthen links and interactions between SDG16.4 and other goals and targets.

According to the World Bank, "a running debate exists regarding strategies for stopping IFFs."[197] The international community has at its disposal a range of "interlocking tools to deal with the nexus of problems around illicit capital flows, capital flight, corruption, money laundering, tax avoidance, tax havens, and transfer mispricing."[198] There are growing efforts to monitor whether these tools are being used. The OECD compares the performance of its members in stopping illicit flows, with $147 million returned and $1.4 billion frozen between 2010 and 2012.[199] It also tracks the action that members are taking "to avoid being safe havens for illegal money."

There is, however, no evidence whether these and other reforms are beginning to reverse the increase in illicit flows at a global level. Neither is there a consensus on how developing countries can reduce the risk of illicit flows leaving their borders. Anti-money laundering initiatives have played a dominant role in responses to illicit financial flows. However, "there is little clear evidence that [these] policies have had any impact in stemming the scale either of money laundering or the crimes that yield proceeds to be laundered."[200] This is "partly due to the fact they have never been subject to any serious regulatory impact assessment or cost-benefit analysis."[201]

Corruption is another area where "research has lagged policy."[202] A recent systematic review identifies two types of intervention:[203]

- Programs that strengthen monitoring and increase financial incentives not to engage in corruption.
- Interventions that "change the underlying rules of the system" so "incentives are naturally better aligned with those of society and there are fewer opportunities or reasons to engage in corruption."

The review finds evidence of impact for interventions that combine monitoring with changes in incentives such as the increased likelihood or cost of being caught. There is also some evidence that

'rule-changing' interventions, such as decentralization, can work and may be more sustainable in the long term. However, it finds a 'glaring' lack of reliable research, with only 14 studies meeting its criteria for inclusion. More research is urgently needed, and "it is imperative… that it examines each anti-corruption strategy in a variety of different settings."

A review of donor supported anti-corruption initiatives also finds few relevant studies. It finds strong evidence for the impact of public financial management on reducing corruption, and mixed evidence for the effectiveness of audit institutions. There is fair evidence that anti-corruption authorities, civil service reforms, and conditionalities in aid allocations are ineffective in reducing corruption. Evidence was assessed as weak for more than half of the interventions that were assessed.[204]

Gender Equality and Non-Discrimination

Delivery of the human rights dimension of the SDGs has, to date, received comparatively little attention, beyond calls for rights-based approaches to the collection and disaggregation of statistics.[205]

The proposed indicator for SDG16.b (non-discriminatory laws and policies) covers the individual *experience* of discrimination, not the nature and quality of the laws and policies themselves. The Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have collected evidence on direct and indirect discrimination for various groups (for example for lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people),[206] offering a source of information that could be pulled together to inform delivery of this target.

There is, however, consolidated evidence of 'what works' to strengthen laws and policies. A greater focus on solutions and alternatives seems to offer promises, however. The campaign to end child immigration detention offers one example. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has found that any detention of a child based on their or their parents' migration status always constitutes a child rights violation.[207] Efforts to change this practice have relied on demonstrating to governments that alternatives are effective and cheaper, and still allow states to "achieve legitimate policy goals."[208] This combination of a rights-based case, with a case for action based on economic and social outcomes, offers potential for a future agenda for non-discriminatory laws and policies, and for related targets such as those for labor rights.

By contrast, the importance of "the systematic mainstreaming of a gender perspective in the implementation of the Agenda" has been given prominence at senior levels at an early stage of implementation of Agenda 2030. At the Global Leaders' Meeting on Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in 2015, Heads of State and Government underlined their commitment to strengthening institutions for gender equality as a precondition for delivery of the SDGs.[209] 93 countries have now made commitments to stepping up national, regional and global action for gender equality.[210]

A systematic review of interventions to promote gender equality and women's empowerment focused on property rights, labor markets and political participation.[211] Most interventions delivered some positive outcomes for women, but the extent to which these outcomes led to broader structural changes is unknown. The World Development Report 2012 argued that four areas should be the highest priority for intervention by policymakers: reducing gender gaps in human capital endowments, closing wage and productivity gaps, shrinking gender differences in voice, and limiting the reproduction of

gender inequality over time.[212] It sets out a menu of policy responses for each area, concluding that evidence on what works has improved markedly. More evidence is needed in two areas:

- Comparing the relative impact of interventions that aim for incremental change, with current gender norms and those that aim to transform gender roles.
- Evaluating strategies that combine a 'package' of multiple interventions to determine the extent to which they reinforce each other's impact.

Findings

This section has mapped the available evidence to inform the delivery of the 13 targets for just societies.

1. **Investment in evidence is a priority for access to justice and rule of law.**
   SDG16.3 has the potential to trigger dramatic increases in access to justice, with a substantial impact on those most likely to be left behind in all countries. Successful implementation will increase prospects for the delivery of many other SDGs. At present, there is limited evidence for what works. While work has begun to cost the expanded provision of basic legal services, "only a relatively small proportion of [current] programs that aim to provide services to the poor are able successfully to reach scale and sustainability."[213] An action-oriented research agenda is badly needed, tailored to the demands of delivering SDG16.3.

2. **Action on access to justice cannot wait for new research findings to be published.**
   Many countries have been experimenting with new approaches to increasing access to justice, based on leadership at national and city levels, and from communities that are outside the justice system. These 'pathfinders' can act as a laboratory for innovation and experimentation, especially as increased investment is made available for piloting promising approaches and their work is tied to the research agenda proposed above. There is an opportunity for this network of pathfinders to work together to define priorities and to begin building an agenda for action for 2020 and beyond.

3. **The international roadmap for achieving universal birth registration must be implemented.**
   CIC's *Mapping SDG16+ - The Indicators* explores this issue in more detail. It identifies *delivery of universal civil registration and vital statistics* systems as one of four overarching priorities for an SDG16+ data strategy. The Roadmap for Health Measurement and Accountability and Scaling up Investment Plan provide an agreed approach for delivering this priority. Debate on legal identity is at an earlier stage, but a new partnership between governments, the UN and the private sector is beginning to explore a fresh approach.[214]

4. **Illicit financial flows are another pressing priority.**
   Illicit financial flows have steadily risen up the international agenda, with commitments to reduce these flows made in both the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and Agenda 2030. The G20 and OECD are engaged in this issue and many developing countries see a reduction in illicit flows as essential to delivery of the SDGs.[215] A methodology for measuring illicit flows needs to urgently be agreed, allowing intermediate targets to be set for reducing aggregate flows. Priorities for implementation must be developed, "based on an evidence-based approach to policy selection, a better balance between different policy instruments (including an emphasis on good governance policies to prevent the corruption that yields illicit flows), and an equitable allocation of the costs of implementing such policies between rich and poor countries."[216]

5. **SDG16+ provides a basis for mainstreaming human rights and gender across Agenda 2030.**
   A human rights perspective is essential to ensuring delivery of Agenda 2030 to all people whatever their "race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, disability or other status."[217] Disaggregated data for these groups is important but implementation of the SDG targets for rights must also be a priority, based on a constructive dialogue between countries as to how meaningful improvements in justice and equality can be achieved. Integrating evidence on non-discriminatory laws and policies is a priority and could form the basis of an action agenda based around alternatives that strengthen rights while offering social and economic benefits. A similar argument can be made for gender discrimination. The priorities identified in the World Development Report 2012 (reducing gender gaps in human capital endowments, closing wage and productivity gaps, shrinking gender differences in voice, and limiting the reproduction of gender inequality over time) offer a starting point for debate among policymakers.

Three ¦ Partners for Just Societies

CIC's database of partnerships for SDG16+ currently includes 20 partnerships for just societies. The majority of these were launched before 2014 – three have been created since the launch of Agenda 2030, and two new partnerships are proposed (Global Trust for Rule of Law and The Global Forum for Asset Recovery).

None of the partnerships cover all of the targets for just societies. Nearly half have a financial focus, covering stolen assets (Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative), organized crime (The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime), and corruption (Global Organization of Parliamentarians against Corruption, Partnering Against Corruption Initiative, Transparency International - the Global Coalition Against Corruption, Tools and Resources for Anti-Corruption Knowledge (TRACK)). A few have a specific group focus (The Global Partnership on Children with Disabilities) and some cover all aspects of a particular group (Every Woman Every Child). Three major partnerships are summarized below – for data in health, legal empowerment, and stolen asset recovery.

Data for Health Initiative	Formed: 2015

"Aims to help more than one billion people in 20 countries across Africa, Asia, and Latin America live healthier, longer lives"

Objectives

- Provide governments, aid organizations, and public health leaders with tools and systems to better collect data.
- Support new mechanisms for conducting public health surveys.
- Support training programs for local officials.

Global Legal Empowerment Initiative (Namati and Open Society Justice Initiative)	Formed: 2011

"An operational collaborative effort between Namati, a new international organization dedicated to legal empowerment and Open Society Justice Initiative, which has deepened and expanded its work in the field"

Objectives

- Implement and evaluate innovative legal empowerment interventions.
- Provide a platform for sharing research findings, training materials, monitoring and evaluation tools, case management systems, and advocacy strategies.
- Provide legal empowerment innovations and research.
- Improve exchange and learning among donors.

Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative	Formed: 2007

"A partnership between the World Bank Group and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) that supports international efforts to end safe havens for corrupt funds."

Objectives

- Provide training and capacity building.
- Provide policy analysis and knowledge-building.
- Assist countries in recovery of stolen assets.

Partnerships in this area have the following strengths:

- Namati has started the work of building a **global movement for legal empowerment** and provides a platform for translating innovation at a grassroots level into an international policy agenda for

access to justice. Given that many governments are strongly committed to innovation in this area, this provides a basis for giving identity to what is a growing field and for uniting it behind clear priorities for delivery of SDG16.3.

- Delivery partnerships for **birth registration** are in place and there is new impetus behind the related challenge of universal **legal identity**. Accelerating progress towards universal civil registration and vital statistics systems is the most obvious 'quick win' for the SDG16+ targets for just societies.
- There has been a proliferation of partnerships that focus on various aspects of **illicit financial flows** and **asset recovery**. They offer a platform for a big push to deliver the Addis and Agenda 2030 commitments to reduce these flows, and to strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime.

There are, however, weaknesses:

- **Weak research networks.** There is, as yet, no research agenda that responds to the lack of evidence for what works.
- **Lack of vision.** Justice is fundamental to Agenda 2030, but there is currently no overarching vision for how the SDG16+ targets for just societies can be delivered.

Over the next 3-5 years, partnerships for just societies might work on the following priorities:

1. Agree and implement a **research agenda** for increasing access to justice.
2. Strengthen the **movement for justice**, increasing innovation and experimentation at national level, and learning from the work of pathfinders.
3. Make measurable progress on expanding **civil registration and vital statistics systems**, at a rate consistent with achieving universal birth registration by 2030. At the same time, develop an agenda for providing legal identity for those currently without identification.
4. Agree a methodology measuring **illicit financial flows** and develop proposals for meeting interim targets for the aggregate reduction of these flows. Demonstrate that reductions in illicit flows are having a positive impact of the financing of Agenda 2030.
5. Set out an agenda for action for delivering the targets for **human rights and gender discrimination**, as part of a broader vision of a just society.

Inclusive Societies

Inclusive Societies

SDG16.6 makes a commitment to the development of "effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels."

This headline target for the *inclusive societies* component of SDG16+ is supported by four targets that cover various policies and institutions that are essential to sustainable development and a further four targets that focus on global governance and institutions.

This cluster also emphasises participation, with targets for political, social and economic inclusion, inclusive and participatory decision-making, women's participation and leadership, and public access to information.

This section:

- Reviews data for the 13 targets for inclusive societies, focusing on evidence that strengthening institutions can take a generation or more.
- Explores recent innovation and experiments in work to strengthen institutions, and discusses migration policies and women's leadership. This is a preliminary review of what is an extensive literature, which will be deepened in the next draft of this paper.
- Identifies the strengths and weaknesses of 37 partnerships for inclusive societies.



One ¦ Baseline and Trends

This section reviews available data for determining the baseline for the SDG16+ targets for inclusive societies.[218] It presents data for the proposed SDG16+ indicators where they are available, but explores other sources of data in order to build a fuller picture of trends for standards of governance.

16.6 Effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels

- Budget outturn (16.6.1)
- Satisfaction with public services (16.6.2)

Two indicators are proposed for SDG16.6. The first measures government's ability to spend its approved budget, while the second covers public satisfaction with public services. These indicators are discussed in *CIC's Mapping SDG16+ - The Indicators* paper which notes that:

> Even when both indicators are available, we will still be left with only a partial measure of the effectiveness, accountability and transparency of institutions. This picture could, in time, be strengthened somewhat by indicators from other targets (perceptions of the inclusivity and responsiveness of decision-making from SDG16.7, constitutional protections for freedom of information from SDG16.10, etc.), underlining the need for joined up thinking across all the SDG16+ targets. Once again, it is notable that the focus of the proposed indicators is on national institutions, despite the target's reference to institutions "at all levels".

This section first sets out data for the proposed official indicators, but it then looks further afield to understand trajectories on inclusive societies and the scale of the challenge ahead.

The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) Database has data for 94 countries for aggregate expenditure outturns compared to approved budgets.[219] Limited data is available for high-income countries.[220]

- In total, PEFA has carried out 541 assessments, of which 239 are public. Another 79 are currently being drafted while 33 assessments are in the pipeline.[221]
- Ten countries have had more than ten assessments either at national or sub-national level. Five countries have had between seven to nine assessments, while another 19 have been assessed four to six times.



30% of countries have an aggregate expenditure outturn between 95% and 105% of the approved aggregate budgeted expenditure in at least two of the last three years (Grade A). Another 36% have an aggregate expenditure outturn between 90% and 110% (Grade B), while 23% scored a Grade C, as their aggregate expenditure outturn was between 85% and 115%. For ten countries, performance was below Grade C requirements.[222] Existing data on satisfaction with public services can be found across multiple

perception surveys. However, definitions of what constitutes public services vary and the data is not comparable.

- The World Values Survey provides data for 60 countries, asking people about their confidence in institutions including the armed forces, the police, the courts, government and parliament.
- Similarly, regional Barometers have also collected data for 60 countries on people's "experience of accessing essential government services, including public schools, public clinics and hospitals, registration offices (birth certificate, driver's license, passport, voter's card, permits, etc.), water, sanitation and electricity."[223]
- Gallup has also measured people's confidence in national government, the judicial system and courts, and the local police force, with both displaying positive trends between 2006 and 2014 (based on responses from 147 and 158 countries respectively). There is also data on levels of satisfaction with the availability of quality healthcare and schools – however, this is not disaggregated by private or public services.[224]



This data has considerable potential to guide implementation of Agenda 2030 if a consistent approach to perception surveys can be agreed. Gallup data is currently the most comprehensive:

- Globally, the public has greatest confidence in the military (77%), followed by the police (65%), judiciary (55%) and national government (52%).

- In 81 countries, fewer than half of the population have confidence in their government and, in 16 of these, fewer than a quarter have confidence in their government. In 14 countries, more than 75% of the population is confident in their government.
- For public services, an average of 66% of people are satisfied with their country's education system or schools, 61% with public transport, 59% with roads, and 58% with the availability of quality healthcare.
- Five countries saw a more than 30 percentage point improvement in confidence in government between 2006 and 2016. Similar changes in confidence are reported for other institutions, demonstrating that rapid progress can be made on this indicator.
- Satisfaction in public services moves slightly more slowly, but a 10-25 percentage point increase is feasible within a decade.

The Worldwide Governance Indicators include an index for three dimensions of governance relevant to this cluster:

- **Government Effectiveness** and **Regulatory Quality** measure "the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies."[225] The data shows only modest changes from 2000 to 2014, with a slight deterioration in Regulatory Quality.
- **Voice and Accountability** captures "perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media." These show a small improvement in poorer countries and a small deterioration in richer ones.



Analysis of these indicators also demonstrates the slow pace of institutional change. Drawing on and updating methodology developed by Pritchett and de Weijer,[226] the OECD explores scenarios for the time it would take for a set of countries with weak institutions to reach an 'acceptable' level of institutional quality (defined as the 70th percentile for an aggregate of the three measures presented above, or the same institutional quality as Suriname).[227] It finds that only two of 50 countries would reach this threshold by 2030 under a business-as-usual projection. If all countries improved at the rate of the top three performers from the past decade, ten would still fail to cross the 'acceptable' threshold.

1.b	**Institutions and policies for poverty reduction** ▪ Public spending on women, the poor and vulnerable groups (1.b.1)
17.1	**Institutions and policies for tax collection** ▪ Government revenue as a proportion of GDP (17.1.1) ▪ Budget funded by domestic taxes (17.1.2)
11.3	**Institutions and policies for inclusive urbanization** ▪ Participation structures for cities (11.3.2)
10.7	**Migration policies** ▪ Well-managed migration policies (10.7.2)

Some of the indicators are at an early stage of development. The Inter-agency Expert Group on SDG Indicators has not yet published any analysis for how indicator 1.b.1 (disaggregated data on public spending) or 11.3.2 (participation in cities) will be prepared. There is a methodology in place for SDG17.1.2 (domestic resource mobilization), but data is not yet readily available.

The OECD measures the total tax revenue as a proportion of GDP for 60 countries (17.1.1).[228] In the OECD area, the data shows an upward trend. The OECD average tax revenue as a proportion of GDP has risen 9%, from 25% to 34% between 1965 and 2013. There has been very little deviation from 34% since 2000, most of the increase occurred prior to the millennium.[229] Data is available for 22 Latin American countries, with tax revenue increasing from 15% of GDP in 1990, to 22% in 2014. Only three Asian and eight African countries have data. For the latest year in Africa, tax revenue varies from a low of 16% of GDP in Rwanda and Côte d'Ivoire, to a high of 31% in Tunisia.

In theory, this data has the potential to provide important insights into national ability to finance delivery of Agenda 2030. However, this would require a debate on benchmarks for domestic resource mobilization for countries at different levels of development and an analysis of the financing needs for nationally owned sustainable development strategies.

Although multiple migration policy indexes exist, they only cover certain aspects of migration policy or have limited geographical coverage.[230]

- The annual Commitment to Development Index has been published by the Center for Global Development since 2003. In 2015, it ranked 27 high income countries against seven components, including one on migration. This component covers a range of factors including acceptance levels, burden sharing, integration policies, and ratification of international conventions.[231]
- The Migrant Integration Policy Index uses 167 indicators to measure policies to integrate migrants in 38 countries, including EU Member States, Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the USA.[232] The 2015 Index found that "integration policies in the 38 MIPEX policies are, on average, ambivalent about equal rights and opportunities for immigrants."[233] Overall, there has been a slight improvement between 2010-2014 by +1 on a 100 point scale. This is similar to the trend for 2007-2010.
- Commissioned by the International Organization for Migration, the Economist Intelligence Unit published the Migration Governance Index in 2016 aiming "to act as a potential source for informing implementation of the migration-related SDGs."[234] Looking at 15 countries, it measures their performance across five domains based on 73 qualitative questions. Countries are then

benchmarked as either 'nascent', 'emerging', 'developed' or 'mature'. For the area of 'safe and orderly' migration, five countries were listed as 'emerging', five as 'developed', and the rest as 'mature'.

10.5	**Global financial and economic institutions** ▪ Financial Soundness Indicators (10.5.1)
10.6	**Global financial and economic institutions** ▪ Representation of developing countries in international organizations (10.6.1)
17.10	**Equitable trade system** ▪ Worldwide levels of customs tariffs (17.10.1)
16.8	**Participation in global governance**

According to the latest Global Financial Stability Report, "financial institutions in advanced economies face a number of cyclical and structural challenges…these are significant challenges that affect large parts of the financial system, and if unaddressed could undermine financial soundness."[235]

The IMF provides quarterly updates on the Financial Soundness Indicators, with 103 countries reporting regularly.[236] However, countries use different methodologies to compile this data, making meaningful comparisons between countries and over time more difficult. [237]

There is data available on the proportion of members of voting rights of developing countries in international organizations.[238]

- Ten international organizations have trend data available for 2000 up to 2014/15.
- In five of these organizations, the proportion of voting rights for developing countries has not changed, ranging between 50% (Inter-American Development Bank) to 63% (African Development Bank).
- For three organizations, the proportion increased slightly by 2 to 4 percentage points, while it decreased by 1 percentage point in the UN General Assembly and World Trade Organization.

Tariff data is available for more than 190 countries in the ITC/UNCTAD/WTO database.[239] In their 2015 'Key Statistics and Trends in Trade Policy' report, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) observed that, "although tariffs have been declining in most sectors, they have increased in others. Nonetheless, the trend of increasing tariffs has been limited to a number of cases."[240] UNCTAD also noted regional improvements as, "tariff liberalization process of the past 5 years is reflected in lower tariffs for most intra- and inter-regional flows."[241] In the future, these data should provide evidence on whether a perceived backlash against international trade is having a real world impact.

10.2	**Political, social and economic inclusion** ▪ Groups living below 50 per cent of median income (10.2.1)
16.7	**Inclusive and participatory decision-making** ▪ Representation in public institutions (16.7.1) ▪ Perceptions of inclusiveness of decision making (16.7.2)

5.5	**Women's participation and leadership** ▪ Seats held by women in national parliaments and local governments (5.5.1) ▪ Women in managerial positions (5.5.2)
16.10	**Public access to information** ▪ Human rights abuses of journalists, trade unionists and human rights advocates (16.10.1) ▪ Public access to information (16.10.2)

SDG10.2 aims to "empower and promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion or economic or other status." Limited data is available on political and social inclusion. Polling shows strong demand for governments that "are honest and effective and can deliver on [people's] needs,"[242] combined with widespread frustration at a failure to meet these expectations.

For economic inclusion, an indicator is proposed for the proportion of the population living below 50 percent of median income, a group that is either in poverty or at risk of falling into poverty. Global data is not yet available:

- The EU measures the number of people that have a disposable income at less than 60% of the national median. There has been a slight decline in the total population in the EU-27 at risk of poverty or social exclusion between 2005 and 2015. In 2005, the percentage at risk was 26% of the total population, but by 2015 this had fallen to 24%.
- The OECD measures the ratio of the number of people whose income falls below half the median household income of the total population.[243] In 2012, the average poverty rate across OECD countries was 11%. "From the mid-1980s to around 2012, poverty rates rose in 15 out of 18 countries for which data are available, resulting in an overall increase of 2.7 percentage points for the OECD as a whole."[244]
- The World Bank compiles data on the percentage of people below national poverty lines. On average, poverty has declined between 2000 and 2015 from 42% to 25%, based on available country data.[245] However, recent trends suggest that it is on the rise again – increasing by 3% between 2013 and 2015.

There is data available on women's participation in national parliaments – but not on their involvement in local governments (SDG5.5). The ILO also has some data available on women in managerial positions:

- Based on data collated by UN Women and the InterParliamentary Union, the number of seats held by women in national parliaments has risen globally by 9% since the millennium. In 2000, 14% of national parliament seats were held by women, but by 2016 this had risen to 23%.[246]
- The ILO compiles data on the female share of employment, by level of position, and by private/public sector. Data is available for 65 countries. On average (based on available data), the proportion of women in managerial positions has increased since the millennium. In 2000, the average proportion of women in managerial positions was 28%, and this rose to 31% in 2014.[247]

For SDG16.10, available data suggests that public access to information may be decreasing, despite a positive trend in the number of freedom of and/or access to information laws adopted globally. "Since 2007, countries in every region have adopted FOI laws, so that more than 90 countries (including some

independent jurisdictions) now have such laws."[248] However, the World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development report warns that a global trend of 'legal deterioration by imitation' has emerged, and that media and journalists face growing legal constraints.

The lives of journalists are also increasingly at risk. "At least 827 journalists were killed in the last ten years," according to the UNESCO Director-General's 2016 Report on the Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity.[249] 2015 was the second deadliest year for journalists. Less is known about the number of trade unionists and human rights advocates affected. Similarly, there is no collated data on the kidnapping, enforced disappearance, arbitrary detention or torture of journalists and associated media personnel.



Findings

This section demonstrates the scale of the challenge represented by the Agenda 2030 commitment to build inclusive societies that are based on "good governance at all levels and on transparent, effective and accountable institutions."[250]

1. Agenda 2030 relies on an unprecedented improvement in standards of governance.

The 17 SDGs and 169 targets comprise "a supremely ambitious and transformational vision."[251] Much of the responsibility for their delivery falls on governments, with institutions required to take on challenges that range from providing quality education to shifting their economies towards more sustainable patterns of consumption and production. The challenge is greatest for states with the weakest institutions. Even if their institutional quality improves at the rate of the fastest performers from history, they will fail "to improve institutions at the rate needed to reach thresholds envisaged for the new development goals."[252]

2. Data on satisfaction with public services could help monitor progress in building inclusive societies.

Perhaps the simplest way to gauge progress in building effective, accountable and transparent institutions is to ask people how satisfied they are with the services they receive. This indicator is

easy to understand, relatively cheap to collect, and provides rapid feedback when services improve or deteriorate. Satisfaction data for health, education, transport and other services will build links with those working on these SDGs. A more detailed analysis of current satisfaction data should be commissioned and this indicator should be prioritized in an SDG16+ data strategy (see the CIC *Mapping SDG16+ - The Indicators* paper).

3. **Better data is needed for political, social and economic inclusion.**

The SDG16+ targets are of critical importance at a time when large numbers of people feel that development has left them behind and have low levels of trust in institutions. We currently lack good data to quantify this phenomenon, or to monitor trends in political, social and economic inclusion. Addressing this deficit is essential to demonstrating the relevance of the new agenda and its commitment to inclusion for all.

Two ¦ Mapping the Evidence

This section provides an overview of a growing body of evidence for what works to prevent violence. This is not a comprehensive review, but includes the main features across three domains of prevention: interpersonal violence, violent conflict, and gross violations of human rights. This section will be deepened and expanded in the next draft of this paper.

Building Effective, Accountable and Transparent Institutions

The 21st century has seen a wave of crises, including the global financial crisis and subsequent recessions of 2008, the Eurozone debt crisis and Brexit, a succession of commodity shocks involving both high and low prices, the Arab Spring, and recession in previously fast-growing middle income countries.

During this 'long crisis of globalization,' governments are facing a series of complex, fast-moving and often unfamiliar challenges, most of which are driven by forces that are outside national control.[253] Despite greatly increased need for collective action, international organizations are also struggling to respond, with most still configured for the 20th century.

At all levels, leaders find their space for maneuver is also limited:

> *At many (probably most) times, traditional levers will not work or will seem less effective, as power becomes more diffuse and risks increasingly complex and interrelated. Even in the best case, outcomes will be 'messy' and far from perfect.*[254]

The challenge is a universal one, affecting governments in countries of all income levels. A number of rich countries are experiencing a wave of populist discontent and political instability, while some middle income governments are struggling to manage more complex economies and meet the needs of increasingly assertive populations. For countries with the weakest institutions, "the capability of the state to implement is both severely limited and improving (if at all) only very slowly."[255]

The crisis in governance also affects institutions at all levels, from the local to the international, and of all types, stretching beyond government to business, civil society and religious groups.[256]

At the same time, there is widespread skepticism about the ability of a 'good governance' agenda to increase the capacity of the state to deliver.[257] Improvements in the Worldwide Governance Indicators were only weakly associated with achievement of the MDGs.[258] Evidence is also weak that externally-driven governance reforms lead to more effective government.[259] Even when results are achieved, they tend to be superficial, designed to "enhance an entity's external legitimacy and support, even when they do not demonstrably improve performance"[260]

Major criticisms of the traditional approaches to institutional strengthening include:

- Concentration on the formal structures of institutions, at the expense of attempts to strengthen their ability to function.[261]
- A failure to prioritize reforms that will make the greatest contribution to 'real world' and immediate challenges.[262]
- Use of a 'cookie cutter' approach to reform, where international models are imposed without regard for the local context.[263]

- A reliance on technocratic approaches that are poorly aligned with political realities and incentives.[264]
- Tracking outputs (whether a reform has been completed) rather than outcomes and impact (whether it has improved an institutions ability to deliver in ways that improve people's lives).[265]

Similar criticisms have been made of the governance initiatives that aim to promote more transparent governance. A review of five multi-stakeholder initiatives found "clear evidence that efforts to improve transparency are bearing fruit in at least in some participating countries."[266] However, "there is little evidence thus far that these reforms have been effective at improving government accountability or achieving broader social, economic, and/or environmental impacts." Technocratic solutions, in other words, had not necessarily led to 'real world' outcomes.

This combination of rising challenge with a lack of confidence in existing tools has led to a period of experimentation and innovation in the field of governance and institutional development. Three inter-related and overlapping trends can be detected in what remains a fluid landscape.

First, there is a shift towards **problem-solving approaches**. Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock have called for a focus on solving locally identified problems to be combined with increased innovation and experimentation, faster feedback loops to allow for learning and adaption in real time, and broader partnerships for design and implementation.[267] The *Doing Development Differently* manifesto, which has gained broad international support, takes a similar approach. It also emphasizes spreading risk (making 'small bets': pursuing activities with promise and dropping others) and the use of 'real results' to bolster confidence that progress is possible.[268]

Second, an **open government paradigm** has emerged, "where institutions share and leverage data, pursue collaborative problem-solving, and partner with citizens to make better decisions."[269] This paradigm places a twin emphasis on 'big data' and citizen participation.[270] The former aims to transform the delivery of public services by allowing for much stronger links between finance (and other inputs) and results. The latter is based on the belief that "when institutions open themselves to diverse participation and better coordinate efforts with other stakeholders, governing decisions are more effective and legitimate."[271]

Third, there is renewed interest in the **governance challenges faced by richer countries**. The 'good governance' agenda was primarily driven by the problems of countries with low institutional capacity. The combination of unfamiliar challenges, falling public trust, and fiscal deficits has stimulated renewed investment in institutional reform in developed countries. A variety of foundations, research centers and think tanks are engaged in this work, and have begun to build networks that are well-suited to the universal nature of the SDGs. One recent review, for example, looks at public sector approaches to innovation, drawing together experience from "developed and emergent economies, countries of varying sizes, and all levels of government, from the city, regional to national level."[272]

These new directions are beginning to coalesce into a coherent research agenda. In part, this aims to provide practical guidance for policymakers and practitioners. Andrews, Pritchett and Woolcock, for example, have recently published a guide to problem driven approaches to building state capability. It includes tools that aim to help reformers identify problems, break them down into manageable

components, consider the opportunities for and obstacles to engagement, and design a sequenced process of reform.[273]

Questions are also being asked about impact. The MacArthur Research Network on Opening Governance is mapping existing research into open governance and designing a research agenda with two themes: collaborative and data driven governance. What is striking is the range of issues, approaches and partnerships that are being explored, many of which fall far outside a traditional 'good governance' agenda. The network's action research includes projects on fostering collaboration between fire departments, developing a network of public sector innovators, and leveraging social media data to improve the reporting of and response to sexual violence in India and Arizona.

The Research Consortium on the Impact of Open Government, meanwhile, has brought together Global Integrity, The Governance Lab @ NYU, the World Bank, the Open Government Partnership and the Results for Development Institute. Building on a World Bank mapping of research into open government impact and outcomes,[274] it aims "to support innovative research aimed at understanding the extent to which reforms deliver, not only in terms of open governance itself, but also in terms of improved public sector performance and service delivery gains."[275]

Well-Managed Migration Policies

Agenda 2030 recognizes "the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development." It makes a commitment to ensuring safe, orderly and regular migration, to protecting the rights of migrants, and to increasing the resilience of communities hosting refugees. SDG10.7 sets a target for the "implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies." The needs of refugees and internally displaced persons are underlined.

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants sets out a process for agreeing global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration that will "set out a range of principles, commitments and understandings among Member States regarding international migration in all its dimensions."[276] A parallel process will agree a 'comprehensive refugee response framework'. The compacts will be finalized in 2018 and provide an opportunity to develop consensus on the policies that will deliver Agenda 2030 commitments to migrants and to refugees.

The rate of current migration and scale of the current displacement crisis has increased investment in evidence generation. In 2011, the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development (KNOMAD) was formed as "a global hub of knowledge and policy expertise on migration and development issues." It aims to synthesize knowledge of what works, "generat[e] a menu of policy choices based on multidisciplinary knowledge and evidence," and provide assistance to both sending and receiving countries.

An intensive debate is underway on how migration policies can be improved, with an emphasis on the need for urgent action to address a crisis of protracted displacement. Drawing on a collaboration between six international organizations, CIC identified four strategic shifts for addressing refugees and IDPs:

- Putting the welfare of refugees at the heart of Agenda 2030, with "joint analysis and multi-year planning and engagement from development and humanitarian actors to achieve collective outcomes."

- A greater focus on shared benefits between displaced people and host communities.
- Promotion of the economic and social inclusion of refugees through a series of legal, regulatory, fiscal and organizational actions.
- Support for host countries in recognition of the global public good they are providing combined with "internal financial transfers… to help municipal, state and local governments absorb IDPs."

At a policy and programmatic level, evidence is weak for how the development impacts of migration can be maximized, with "current tools and responses fail[ing] to match the scale and complexity of the challenge."[277] A KNOMAD review examined three stages of migration: pre-departure, during migration, and directed towards possible return.[278] In many cases, it found a lack of quality evaluations but concluded that:

> *The preliminary evidence suggests some areas of policy success: bilateral migration agreements for seasonal migration with countries whose workers have few other migration options; developing new savings products for migrants which allow them some control over how this money is used; and some efforts to provide financial education to migrants and their families.*

Efforts to lower the cost of remittances, reduce the cost of a passport, provide dual citizenship, and remove exit barriers to migration are found to be promising. Other interventions may have negative impacts (high minimum wages) or not be cost effective (language training, job search assistance).

Women's Participation and Leadership

According to a recent review, "it is not possible to track clear trajectories of change between women's voice and leadership and wider gender equality gains."[279] However, it finds evidence that "women's voice and leadership has led to more gender-responsive law and policy, more gender-responsive provision of public goods and services, more inclusive political settlements, more equitable social norms and better socioeconomic outcomes for women and girls." Other studies have reached similar conclusions, but called for more detailed research into the mechanisms through which women's leadership can lead to broader outcomes.[280]

Findings

This section has reviewed evidence of what works to build effective, accountable and transparent institutions. It has also discussed migration policies and women's participation and leadership.

1. A new agenda is emerging for tackling poor governance and weak institutions.

A crisis in governance has affected countries from all income groups and institutions of all types. This has led to a period of reappraisal, as practitioners look for new tools and approaches. This innovation is now beginning to feed through to a research agenda. Knowledge and research networks have been formed to take this work forward and a mapping of research is underway. While it will be many years before there is consensus on impact, the focus on problem-solving approaches and links between 'big data' and citizen participation offer fruitful opportunities for innovation and experimentation. The universality of the new agenda encourages the flow of knowledge between countries of all income levels, and calls for a bigger role for city and subnational actors. As recommended above, better data is needed to monitor trends in political, social and economic inclusion and to guide implementation.

2. **The global compact provides an opportunity to debate the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies.**

   Intergovernmental processes have been launched that will lead to the adoption of a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration and to a comprehensive refugee response framework. Both processes aim to find durable and holistic solutions, and to develop comprehensive responses that bring together countries of origin, destination and transit. This is an opportunity to develop models and approaches that will allow delivery of Agenda 2030's commitment to meets the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons and migrants.

3. **Strengthening women's participation and leadership is a priority.**

   SDG5.5 aims to "ensure women's full and effective participation and equal opportunities for leadership at all levels of decision-making in political, economic and public life." Delivery of this target is a priority for SDG16+, given the role that "women's collective voice, when strategically oriented and perceived to be broad-based" can play in driving transformational change.

4. **Better data is needed for political, social and economic inclusion.**

   The SDG16+ targets are of critical importance at a time when large numbers of people feel that development has left them behind and have low levels of trust in institutions. We currently lack good data to quantify this phenomenon, or to monitor trends in political, social and economic inclusion. Addressing this deficit is essential to demonstrating the relevance of the new agenda and its commitment to inclusion for all.

Three ¦ Partners for Inclusive Societies

CIC's database of partnerships for SDG16+ currently includes 37 partnerships for inclusive societies. Around half of the partnerships have been in existence since before 2010, with a large part of the remainder launched between 2010 and 2014. Six partnerships have been launched in the past two years.

Between the partnerships, nearly all of the targets for inclusive societies are covered, except 17.10 and 10.6. Partnerships cover democracy (Community of Democracies), transparency (The Transparency & Accountability Initiative), tax (Global Alliance for Tax Justice), gender (Fund for Gender Equality, International Alliance of Women), and migration (Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration).

Open Government Partnership	Formed: 2011

"Multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance"

Objectives

- Maintain high-level political leadership and commitment to OGP within participating countries.
- Support domestic reformers with technical expertise and inspiration.
- Foster more engagement in OGP by a diverse group of citizens and civil society organizations.
- Ensure that countries are held accountable for making progress toward achieving their OGP commitments.

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative	Formed: 2003

"A global standard to promote the open and accountable management of natural resources"

Objectives

- Strengthen government and company systems.
- Inform public debate.
- Promote understanding.

The most important partnership is the Open Government Partnership (OGP). Launched in September 2011 by eight governments (Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States), it now includes 69 countries as members – representing a third of the world's population. Aiming to "secure concrete commitments from governments to promote transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen governance," it has a central role to play in the delivery of Agenda 2030.

OGP aims to act as "a platform for voluntary cooperation and peer exchange and learning" for the new agenda, drawing on "the experience of its participating governments and civil society organizations... to encourage transparent, accountable, participatory, and technology-enabled implementation" of the agenda.[281] For member countries, Open Government National Action Platforms provide an important focus for the delivery of SDG16+ targets for inclusive societies, and for helping equip governments to deliver the agenda as a whole.

OGP is one of the few mature platforms for SDG16+, with a universal membership and an innovative model that combines national ownership with independent reporting on the delivery of commitments. The priority is to build on its work towards "more inclusive, stable and sustainable societies" while "mak[ing] sure that real change is happening on the ground in a majority of OGP countries and that this change is benefiting citizens."

Conclusions

1. **Targets for peaceful, just and inclusive societies pose a daunting challenge.**

   The 36 SDG16+ targets are extremely stretching. Many do not quantify their level of ambition, and those that do imply unprecedented rates of improvements in peace, justice, governance and rights. There are few projections to 2030, but a substantial gap exists between the aspirations of the targets and business-as-usual trajectories.

   There is little data to establish trajectories for most of the indicators and a great deal of uncertainty surrounding projections to 2030. This makes it hard for policymakers to understand the scale of the task they face. Scenarios should therefore be constructed to demonstrate a range of outcomes against the key targets for peace, justice and governance. The links with, and implications for, other SDGs can then be explored.

2. **Evidence is improving for what works to deliver peaceful, just and inclusive societies.**

   Recent years have seen a substantial investment in understanding outcomes and impact from interventions that aim to prevent violence, promote access to justice, and strengthen institutions.

   Knowledge and research networks are also growing in number and effectiveness, from the established (such as the Violence Prevention Alliance), to the newly formed (the Research Consortium on the Impact of Open Government).

   Work has been completed or is underway to compile evidence from multiple sources into a single evidence base and to translate evidence into a format that can be used by policymakers and practitioners. In some areas, such as birth registration, an agreed international strategy and financing plan are in place.

3. **The evidence base has significant limitations, however.**

   Evidence for the prevention of violence, conflict and human rights abuses is fragmented across multiple communities. This has inhibited the development of an integrated approach to prevention. Work is needed to build a more integrated understanding, drawing out the common features and differences for various forms of prevention.

   For the rule of law and access to justice, the evidence of what works is limited, and "suggests that only a relatively small proportion of programmes that aim to provide services to the poor are able successfully to reach scale and sustainability."[282]

   Recent years have seen rapid changes in approaches to governance and institutional strengthening. This is only just beginning to feed through to a research agenda and it will be many years before a consensus on impact can be reached.

4. **Evidence needs to be translated into an agenda for action.**

   Policymakers and practitioners need to make better use of evidence and data, including through the use of real time data to shorten feedback loops and allow for quicker learning. Changing practice among some professional groups – such as the police – demonstrates what can be achieved.

   An overarching research strategy is needed to bring together data, evidence and learning across the SDG16+ targets. This would maximize learning across sectoral boundaries, reduce costs, and provide more coherent lessons and guidance for policymakers.

The main priority must be to gather evidence for what works at scale, with the aim of creating a virtuous circle where increasingly ambitious implementation leads to substantial strengthening of the evidence base.

5. **Priorities for delivery are needed to answer the question "where do we start?"**

   A number of delivery priorities have been explored in this mapping paper and in the parallel paper which explores a strategy for improving SDG16+ data.

   These priorities are presented for discussion and include:

   - **Peaceful societies**: (i) stepping up prevention for countries in conflict or at risk of conflict; (ii) tackling urban insecurity, with a focus on the most insecure cities and communities, and on young people; and (iii) scaling up implementation of international frameworks for preventing violence against women and children.
   - **Just societies**: (i) investing in innovation and evidence for access to justice, and using this to build and resource a movement for justice; (ii) delivering universal birth registration and the accurate recording of all deaths through the Roadmap for Health Measurement and Accountability; and (iii) delivering a measurable reduction in illicit financial flows.
   - **Inclusive societies:** (i) building on recent innovations in governance and institutions; (ii) using the development of the global compact for migration and the comprehensive refugee response framework to develop a new consensus on migration policies; and (iii) developing concrete proposals for increasing women's participation and leadership.

6. **An integrated approach is needed for the delivery of the SDG16+ targets.**

   At present, implementation of SDG16 and related targets is fragmented.

   Approaches to preventing violence, promoting access to justice, and strengthening institutions are split across communities that are usually defined by the nature of the *problem*. By contrast, most *solutions* can only be implemented through strategies that span sectors and maximize the use of scarce resources.

   There is a danger that implementation efforts will be too narrow, rather than focusing on the underlying drivers of violence, injustice and instability on the one hand, and the potential for building more effective states on the other.

7. **A number of areas emerge from this review which would benefit from a more integrated perspective.**

   These include:

   - Approaches to mainstreaming a **gender and rights perspective**, given the central role that empowerment of women and the elimination of discrimination play in strategies to tackle violence, promote justice and strengthen institutions.
   - The potential for the greater use of **problem-solving approaches**, especially those that aim to confront obstacles to achievement of the other SDGs (confronting the insecurity that stops children from learning, for example; the lack of justice that prevents inclusive urbanization; or the need for greater institutional capacity to deliver one or more of the 169 SDG targets).

- The need to transform **norms, values and expectations** across the SDG16 targets, for example to change perceptions of what the state is expected to deliver; address the unwillingness of justice professionals to serve marginalized communities; or confront the patterns of privilege and impunity that lead to high levels of violence against children.

8. New types of partnership and alliance are needed.

There is also the need for joint action to explore cross-government implementation structures and mechanisms to allow non-government actors to play a full role in national partnerships for peaceful, just and inclusive societies.

Joined-up approaches to budgeting are essential, to avoid double counting, to maximize scarce resources, and to allow for a full exploration of alternative financing strategies.

Universality provides important opportunities for countries to work together in new ways and in new configurations. Already, we are seeing the emergence of innovative networks and partnerships that look very different from those of the MDG era. They have the potential significantly to accelerate delivery of the SDG16+ targets.

Leadership from cities is essential to many SDG16+ priorities. City networks need to be developed and strengthened.

9. Concerted action is needed to build momentum behind the delivery of SDG16+.

For other parts of Agenda 2030, strategies and partnerships have been developed over a decade or more.

- In health, the Global Strategy for Women's, Children's and Adolescents' Health was launched in September 2015 and provides a common framework for partners that is aligned to the SDGs.[283]
- The nutrition sector has united behind a "case for investment" and "a set of the most cost-effective actions which can be scaled up immediately" to deliver SDG2.[284]
- In climate, two High-Level Champions have developed a Roadmap for Climate Action, which aims to ensure the "successful execution of existing efforts and the scaling-up and introduction of new or strengthened voluntary efforts, initiatives and coalitions."[285]

An action platform for SDG16+ would bring together interested stakeholders with the policy leverage, technical expertise and finance to bring coherence to delivery. This would act as an informal 'partnership of partnerships', helping align its members' strategies, identifying opportunities and obstacles to implementation, and acting as a clearing house for best practice in the field and a platform for connecting countries that require expertise and assistance.

10. Key partners should unite behind a roadmap that maximizes opportunities for delivery.

This paper has begun to map existing action to deliver SDG16+, building an integrated picture of all relevant sources of data and evidence, and of national and international best practice. A roadmap would build consensus around strategic priorities for data, evidence generation, delivery and movement building, and use as a basis for a roadmap that will strengthen coalitions and support delivery.

Endnotes

[1] Note on data methodology - these initial scenarios are based on partially disaggregated data for average deaths for 2007-2012 and 2010-2015 from the Small Arms Survey's multi-source database on violent deaths. For the purposes of this calculation, it has been assumed that the country averages are directly comparable. However, the sources upon which the data estimates are based do vary in some cases. If the complete raw data set and metadata become available, the accuracy of these calculations will be improved, and the current predictions are likely to be subject to change.
[2] Steven Pinker (2015), 'Graphic evidence: Steven Pinker's optimism on trial', *The Guardian,* 11 September 2015, available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ng-interactive/2015/sep/11/graphic-evidence-steven-pinkers-optimism-on-trial
[3] Small Arms Survey (2016), 'Monitoring Trends in Violent Deaths,' *Research Notes*, Number 59, September 2016, available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-59.pdf
[4] Small Arms Survey (2016), 'Monitoring Trends in Violent Deaths,' *Research Notes*, Number 59, September 2016, available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-59.pdf
[5] Global Peace Index and Institute for Economics and Peace (Undated), *Global Peace Index 2015 - Measuring Peace, Its Causes and Its Economic Value*. Sydney: The Institute for Economics and Peace, available at http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Global-Peace-Index-Report-2015_0.pdf
[6] Small Arms Survey (2016), 'Monitoring Trends in Violent Deaths,' *Research Notes*, Number 59, September 2016, available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-59.pdf
[7] World Health Organization (2014), *Global Status Report On Violence Prevention 2014*. Geneva: World Health Organization, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/145086/1/9789241564793_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1
[8] Small Arms Survey (2015), 'The Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Body Counts database'
[9] Lynn Langton, Marcus Berzofsky, Christopher Krebs, and Hope Smiley-McDonald (2012), 'Victimizations Not Reported to the Police, 2006-2010 - Special Report: National Crime Victimization Survey,' Washington DC: US Department of Justice, available at https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vnrp0610.pdf
[10] World Health Organization (2014), *Global Status Report On Violence Prevention 2014*. Geneva: World Health Organization, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/145086/1/9789241564793_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1
[11] Juanita A Haagsma et al (2015), 'The global burden of injury: incidence, mortality, disability-adjusted life years and time trends from the Global Burden of Disease study 2013,' *Injury Prevention,* doi:10.1136/injuryprev-2015-041616, available at http://injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/early/2015/10/20/injuryprev-2015-041616.full.pdf+html
[12] World Health Organization (2014), *Global Status Report On Violence Prevention 2014*. Geneva: World Health Organization, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/145086/1/9789241564793_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1
[13] Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2008), *Global Burden of Armed Violence 2008*. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, available at http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Global-Burden-of-Armed-Violence-full-report.pdf
[14] Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2008), *Global Burden of Armed Violence 2008*. Geneva: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, available at http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/Global-Burden-of-Armed-Violence-full-report.pdf
[15] For scenarios based on UNODC data, see Carlos J Vilalta (2015), *Global Trends and Projections of Homicidal Violence 2000 to 2030 - Homicide Dispatch 2*. Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute, available at https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Homicide-Dispatch_2_EN_22-04-16.pdf
[16] Urban population growth of Africa 2016-2030 data taken from UN DESA (undated), 'World Urbanization Prospects, the 2014 revision – data,' available at https://esa.un.org/unpd/wup/
[17] Robert Muggah (2012), *Researching the Urban Dilemma: Urbanization, Poverty and Violence*. Ottawa: IDRC, available at https://www.idrc.ca/sites/default/files/sp/Images/Researching-the-Urban-Dilemma-Baseline-study.pdf

[18] The conflict rate would be 2.2, which is below the annual rate for most years during the Cold War period. See Steven Pinker (2015), 'Graphic evidence: Steven Pinker's optimism on trial', *The Guardian,* 11 September 2015, available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/ng-interactive/2015/sep/11/graphic-evidence-steven-pinkers-optimism-on-trial

[19] Maria Krisch, Manuel Eisner, Christopher Mikton and Alexander Butchart (2015), *Global Strategies to Reduce Violence by 50% in 30 Years: Findings from the WHO and University of Cambridge Global Violence Reduction Conference 2014*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, available at http://www.vrc.crim.cam.ac.uk/VRCconferences/conference/violencereductionreport

[20] Robert Muggah and Nathalie Alvarado (2016), 'Latin America Could Cut Its Murder Rate By 50 Percent. Here's How.' *Americas Quarterly*, 4 October 2016, available at http://americasquarterly.org/content/latin-america-could-cut-its-murder-rate-50-percent-heres-how#.V_USdkO7WVV.twitter

[21] Manuel Eisner, Amy Nivette, Aja Louise Murray and Maria Krisch (2016), 'Achieving population-level violence declines: implications of the international crime drop for prevention programming,' *Journal of Public Health Policy*, no 37, S66-80, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27638243

[22] OECD (2015), *States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions.* Paris: OECD Publishing, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264227699-en

[23] Tia Palermo, Jennifer Bleck and Amber Peterman (2013), 'Tip of the Iceberg: Reporting and Gender-Based Violence in Developing Countries,' *American Journal of Epidemiology*, (2013) doi: 10.1093/aje/kwt295, available at http://aje.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/12/12/aje.kwt295.full.pdf+html

[24] To be completed

[25] Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2011), *Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011*. Geneva: Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, available at http://www.genevadeclaration.org/fileadmin/docs/GBAV2/GBAV2011_CH4_rev.pdf, p.117.

[26] World Health Organization, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, and South African Medical Research Council (2013), *Global and regional estimates of violence against women: prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence and nonpartner sexual violence.* Geneva: WHO, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/85239/1/9789241564625_eng.pdf?ua=1

[27] United Nations Children's Fund (2014), *Hidden in Plain Sight: A statistical analysis of violence against children.* New York: Division of Data, Research and Policy, UNICEF, available at http://files.unicef.org/publications/files/Hidden_in_plain_sight_statistical_analysis_EN_3_Sept_2014.pdf

[28] Susan Hillis, James Mercy, Adaugo Amobi, and Howard Kress (2016), 'Global Prevalence of Past year Violence Against Children: A Systematic Review and Minimum Estimates,' *Pediatrics,* 2016;137(3): e20154079, available at http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/137/3/e20154079.full.pdf

[29] United Nations Children's Fund (2014), *Ending Child Marriage: Progress and Prospects*. New York: UNICEF, available at http://www.unicef.org/media/files/Child_Marriage_Report_7_17_LR..pdf

[30] United Nations Children's Fund (2013), *Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: a statistical overview and exploration of the dynamics of change*. New York: UNICEF, available at http://www.unicef.org/publications/index_69875.html#

[31] Yacouba Diallo, Alex Etienne, and Farhad Mehran (2013), *Global child labour trends 2008 to 2012*. Geneva: ILO, available at http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/download.do?type=document&id=23015

[32] Benjamin Coghlan, Pascal Ngoy, Flavien Mulumba, Colleen Hardy, Valerie Nkamgang Bemo, Tony Stewart, Jennifer Lewis, and Richard Brennan (Undated), *Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Ongoing Crisis.* New York: International Rescue Committee, available at https://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/document/661/2006-7congomortalitysurvey.pdf

[33] David Steven (2014), *If Not Now, When? Ending Violence Against the World's Children*. New York: Center on International Cooperation, available at http://www.globaldashboard.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/If_Not_Now_When_Final_201014.pdf; see also David Finkelhor, Lisa Jones, Anne Shattuck & Kei Saito (2013) 'Updated Trends in Child Maltreatment, 2012' Crimes against Children Research Center, available at http://www.unh.edu/ccrc/pdf/CV203_Updated%20trends%202012_Revised_2_20_14.pdf

[34] Cecilia Modig (2009), *Never Violence - Thirty Years on from Sweden's Abolition of Corporal Punishment.* Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden and Save the Children Sweden, available at http://www.government.se/contentassets/6bfb214c582448b6ace4d32978361577/never-violence---thirty-years-on-from-swedens-abolition-of-corporal-punishment, p17

[35] Staffan Janson, Carolina Jernbro, and Bodil Långberg (2011), *Corporal punishment and other humiliating behaviour towards children in Sweden – a national study 2011: English summary.* Karlstad: Stiftelsen Allmänna Barnhuset, available at http://srsg.violenceagainstchildren.org/sites/default/files/consultations/better_data/reference%20material/corporal_punishment_sweden.pdf
[36] Girls Not Brides (2016), *It Takes a Movement: Reflecting on five years of progress towards ending child marriage*. London: Girls Not Brides, available at http://www.girlsnotbrides.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/IT-TAKES-A-MOVEMENT-ENG.pdf
[37] UNICEF Data and Analytics Section (2016), *Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Global Concern*. New York: UNICEF, available at http://www.unicef.org/media/files/FGMC_2016_brochure_final_UNICEF_SPREAD.pdf
[38] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015), *The World's Women 2015 - Trends and Statistics*. New York: United Nations, available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/gender/downloads/WorldsWomen2015_report.pdf
[39] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015), *The World's Women 2015 - Trends and Statistics*. New York: United Nations, available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/gender/downloads/WorldsWomen2015_report.pdf
[40] Staffan Janson, Carolina Jernbro, and Bodil Långberg (2011), Kroppslig bestraffning och annan kränkning av bard i Sverige – en nationall kartläggning 2011. Karlstad: Stiftelsen Allmänna Barnhuset, available at http://www.allmannabarnhuset.se/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Kroppslig_bestraffning_webb.pdf
[41] UNICEF Data and Analytics Section (2016), *Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A Global Concern*. New York: United Nations Children's Fund, available at http://www.unicef.org/media/files/FGMC_2016_brochure_final_UNICEF_SPREAD.pdf; UNICEF Data: Monitoring the Situation of Children and Women, available at http://data.unicef.org/topic/child-protection/female-genital-mutilation-and-cutting/#; UNICEF (2013) *Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting: A statistical overview and exploration of the dynamics of change.* New York: United Nations Children's Fund, available at http://www.unicef.org/media/files/FGCM_Brochure_Lo_res.pdf
[42] Global Migration Data Analysis Centre (2015), *Global Migration Trends Factsheet*. Berlin: IOM, available at https://publications.iom.int/system/files/global_migration_trends_2015_factsheet.pdf, p5
[43] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016), *Global Trends - Forced Displacement in 2015*. Geneva: UNHCR, available at http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7.pdf
[44] International Organization for Migration (2016), 'Promoting safe migration,' available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Promoting-safe-migration_IOM_IATF-Issue-Brief.pdf
[45] United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013), 'Irregular Migration, Human Trafficking and Refugees,' chapter in *International Migration Policies: Government Views and Priorities*. New York: United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/pdf/policy/InternationalMigrationPolicies2013/Report%20PDFs/k_Ch_5.pdf
[46] International Organization for Migration (2016), 'Promoting safe migration,' available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Promoting-safe-migration_IOM_IATF-Issue-Brief.pdf
[47] International Organization for Migration (2013), *World Migration Report 2013*. Geneva: IOM, available at https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/wmr2013_en.pdf
[48] Alliance 8.7 (2016), 'Alliance 8.7 Facts and Figures,' available at http://www.alliance87.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ILO_Alliance87_Factsheets_EN_Web.pdf
[49] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2014), *Global Report on Trafficking in Persons 2014.* Vienna: UNODC, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/glotip/GLOTIP_2014_full_report.pdf
[50] Alliance 8.7 (2016), 'Alliance 8.7 Facts and Figures,' available at http://www.alliance87.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/ILO_Alliance87_Factsheets_EN_Web.pdf
[51] Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development (2015), *Global Burden of Armed Violence 2015: Every Body Counts*. Geneva: Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, available at http://www.genevadeclaration.org/measurability/global-burden-of-armed-violence/global-burden-of-armed-violence-2015.html

[52] Elizabeth Stuart, Emma Samman, William Avis and Tom Berliner (2015), *The data revolution - finding the missing millions*. London: Overseas Development Institute, available at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9604.pdf [doc 386]
[53] Saferworld (Undated), 'Issue brief: Transnational arms flows,' available at http://www.saferworld.org.uk/downloads/pubdocs/issue-brief---transnational-arms-flows.pdf
[54] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2016), *SIPRI Yearbook 2016 - Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: Summary*. Stockholm: SIPRI, available at https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/YB16-Summary-ENG.pdf, and related dataset
[55] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2015), *UNODC Study on Firearms 2015 - A study on the transnational nature of and routes and modus operandi used in trafficking in firearms*. Vienna: UNODC, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/UNODC_Study_on_Firearms_WEB.pdf [doc 234]
[56] International Small Arms Control Standard (2015), *National regulation of civilian access to small arms and light weapons*. New York: UN CASA, available at http://www.smallarmsstandards.org/isacs/0330-en.pdf
[57] Denis Hadzovic, Armin Krzalic, and Sanja Mihajlovic (2011), *Small Arms Survey*. Sarajevo: UNDP/EU, available at http://www.seesac.org/f/docs/SALW-Surveys/Small-Arms-Survey-20102011-Bosnia-and-Herzegovina-EN.pdf
[58] United Nations (2015), *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. New York, United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E
[59] World Health Organization (2014), *Global Status Report On Violence Prevention 2014*. Geneva: World Health Organization, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/145086/1/9789241564793_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1
[60] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010), *The Globalization of Crime - A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*. Vienna: UNODC, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf
[61] Council on Foreign Relations (2011), 'The Global Regime for Terrorism,' available at http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/global-regime-terrorism/p25729
[62] UN Stats (2016), 'SDG Indicators - Metadata 16.a.1,' available at http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/files/Metadata-16-0A-01.pdf
[63] UN Stats (2016), 'SDG Indicators – Global Database: 16.a.1,' available at http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/?indicator=16.a.1
[64] Global data provided by GALLUP for "Do you feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where you live?"
[65] European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014), *Violence against women: an EU-wide survey, main Results,* Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra-2014-vaw-survey-main-results-apr14_en.pdf, P.50.
[66] Jo Inchley, Dorothy Currie, Taryn Young, Oddrun Samdal, Torbjørn Torsheim, Lise Augustson, Frida Mathison, Aixa Aleman-Diaz, Michal Molcho, Martin Weber and Vivian Barnekow (eds) (2016), *Growing up unequal: gender and socioeconomic differences in young people's health and well-being - Health Behaviour in School-Aged Children (HBSC) Study: International Report from the 2013/2014 Survey*. Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe, available at http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/303438/HSBC-No7-Growing-up-unequal-full-report.pdf?ua=1
[67] Global Education Monitoring Team (2016), *Global Education Monitoring Project - Gender Review: Creating Sustainable Futures for All*. Paris: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002460/246045e.pdf, p51
[68] Alina Cosma and Joseph Hancock (Undated), *Bullying Victimisation Trends 2002-10*, Fife: HBSC, available at http://www.hbsc.org/publications/factsheets/Bullying-victimisation-english.pdf
[69] HBSC (2016), 'Bullying and Physical Fights Among Adolescents,' Fact Sheet, 15 March 2016, available at http://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/303485/HBSC-No.7_factsheet_Bullying.pdf?ua=1
[70] Manuel Eisner, Amy Nivette, Aja Louise Murray and Maria Krisch (2016), 'Achieving population-level violence declines: implications of the international crime drop for prevention programming,' *Journal of Public Health Policy*, no 37, S66-80, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27638243
[71] Global Coalition to Protect Education From Attack (2014), *Education Under Attack 2014*. New York: Global Coalition to Protect Education From Attack, available at http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/eua_2014_full_0.pdf

[72] Global Coalition to Protect Education From Attack (2014), *Education Under Attack 2014*. New York: Global Coalition to Protect Education From Attack, available at http://www.protectingeducation.org/sites/default/files/documents/eua_2014_full_0.pdf
[73] United Nations (2016), *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. New York: United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E
[74] Of 188 countries in 2013, war or violence was listed as a top 10 most common cause of disability-adjusted life years, see Christopher J L Murray et al. (2015), 'Global, regional, and national disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) for 306 diseases and injuries and healthy life expectancy (HALE) for 188 countries, 1990–2013: quantifying the epidemiological transition,' *The Lancet*, Volume 386, Issue 10009, 2145 – 2191, available at http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(15)61340-X.pdf Figure 6
[75] Data from Global Health Data Exchange, see http://ghdx.healthdata.org/gbd-results-tool, calculated by sum of percentage of deaths by interpersonal and collective violence and legal intervention for 20-24 year old men, 2015.
[76] Institute for Economics & Peace (2016), *Global Peace Index 2016 - Ten Years of Measuring Peace*. Sydney: Institute of Economics & Peace, available at http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/GPI%202016%20Report_2.pdf
[77] UNICEF (2014), *Children in Danger: Act to end violence against children*. London: UNICEF UK, available at https://www.unicef.org.uk/Documents/Publications/Unicef_ChildreninDanger_ViolencereportW.pdf
[78] Institute for Economics & Peace (2016), *Global Peace Index 2016 - Ten Years of Measuring Peace*. Sydney: Institute of Economics & Peace, available at http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/GPI%202016%20Report_2.pdf
[79] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013), *Global Study on Homicide: Trends/Contexts/Data*. Vienna: UNODC, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/gsh/pdfs/Chapter_4.pdf, Chapter 4
[80] Natalie Wilkins, Benita Tsao, Marci Hertz, Rachel Davis, and Joanne Klevens (2014), *Connecting the Dots: An Overview of the Links Among Multiple Forms of Violence.* Atlanta, GA: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Oakland, CA: Prevention Institute, available at https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/connecting_the_dots-a.pdf
[81] OECD (2016), *States of Fragility 2016 – Highlights*. Paris: OECD, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/Fragile-States-highlights-2016.pdf
[82] John de Boer and Louise Bosetti (2015), 'The Crime-Conflict "Nexus": State of the Evidence,' *Occasional Paper 5.* Tokyo: United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, available at http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/UNU:3134/unu_cpr_crime_conflict_nexus.pdf
[83] Merrie Winfrey (2016), 'Violence in Central America: Not Just An Urban Issue,' 15th June 2016, *Agrilinks*, available at https://agrilinks.org/blog/violence-central-america-not-just-urban-issue
[84] Jose V Gallegos and Italo A Gutierrez (Undated), 'The Effect of Civil Conflict on Domestic Violence: the Case of Peru,' available at http://jvgalleg.mysite.syr.edu/default_files/Research_files/Gallegos-Gutierrez%20%20Civil%20Conflict%20and%20Domestic%20Violence%20JDE.pdf
[85] Natalie Wilkins, Benita Tsao, Marci Hertz, Rachel Davis, and Joanne Klevens (2014), *Connecting the Dots: An Overview of the Links Among Multiple Forms of Violence.* Atlanta, GA: National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Oakland, CA: Prevention Institute, available at https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/connecting_the_dots-a.pdf
[86] OECD (2016), *States of Fragility 2016 – Highlights*. Paris: OECD, available at http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/Fragile-States-highlights-2016.pdf
[87] Etienne G Krug, Linda L Dahlberg, James A Mercy, Anthony B Zwi, and Rafael Lozano (2002), *World report on violence and health*. Geneva: WHO, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42495/1/9241545615_eng.pdf
[88] Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (undated), 'The Public Health Approach to Violence Prevention,' available at https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ph_app_violence-a.pdf
[89] Mark H Moore (1995), 'Public Health and Criminal Justice Approaches to Prevention,' *Crime and Justice*, Vol 19, Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime Prevention (1995), pp. 237-262, available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/1147598?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
[90] Mark H Moore (1993), 'Perspective: Violence Prevention: Criminal Justice or Public Health?' *Health Affairs* 12, no. 4 (1993): 34-45, available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/12/4/34.full.pdf

[91] Manuel Eisner, Amy Nivette, Aja Louise Murray and Maria Krisch (2016), 'Achieving population-level violence declines: implications of the international crime drop for prevention programming,' *Journal of Public Health Policy*, no 37, S66-80, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27638243
[92] Mark Bellis (undated), 'The State of the Violence Prevention Evidence-base,' available at http://apps.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/6th_milestones_meeting/bellis_data_collection_research.pdf
[93] World Health Organization (2014), *Global Status Report On Violence Prevention 2014*. Geneva: World Health Organization, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/145086/1/9789241564793_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1
[94] Diana J Arango, Matthew Morton, Floriza Gennari, Sveinung Kiplesund and Mary Ellsberg (2014), 'Gender, Equality & Development - Interventions to prevent or reduce violence against women and girls: a systematic review of reviews,' *Women's Voice and Agency Research Series 2014 No.10*. Washington DC: The World Bank, available at http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Gender/Arango%20et%20al%202014.%20Interventions%20to%20Prevent%20or%20Reduce%20VAWG%20-%20A%20Systematic%20Review%20of%20Reviews.pdf
[95] WHO, CDC, End Violence Against Children, PAHO, PEPFAR, Together for Girls, UNICEF, UNODC, USAID, and World Bank (2016), *INSPIRE - Seven Strategies for Ending Violence Against Children*. Geneva: WHO, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/207717/1/9789241565356-eng.pdf?ua=1
[96] World Health Organization (2014), *Global Status Report On Violence Prevention 2014*. Geneva: World Health Organization, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/145086/1/9789241564793_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1
[97] Nathalie Alvarado, Robert Muggah and Katherine Aguire (2015), 'Some key good and bad takeaways from a citizen security mapping tool for Latin America,' *Sin Miedos,* available at http://blogs.iadb.org/sinmiedos/2015/10/15/some-key-good-and-bad-takeaways-from-a-citizen-security-mapping-tool-for-latin-america/
[98] Manuel Eisner, Amy Nivette, Aja Louise Murray and Maria Krisch (2016), 'Achieving population-level violence declines: implications of the international crime drop for prevention programming,' *Journal of Public Health Policy*, no 37, S66-80, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27638243
[99] Jeremy Lind, Becky Mitchell, and Brigitte Rohwerder (2016), *Reducing Violence in a Time of Global Uncertainty: Insights from the Institute of Development Studies Addressing and Mitigating Violence Programme*. London: Institute of Development Studies, available at http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/123456789/11736/1/ER197_ReducingViolenceinaTimeofGlobalUncertaintyInsightsfromtheInstituteofDevelopmentStudiesAddressingandMitigatingViolenceProgramme.pdf
[100] World Bank (2011), *World Development Report 2011 - Conflict, Security and Development*. Washington DC: World Bank, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf
[101] World Bank (2011), *World Development Report 2011 - Conflict, Security and Development*. Washington DC: World Bank, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf
[102] World Bank (2011), *World Development Report 2011 - Conflict, Security and Development*. Washington DC: World Bank, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDRS/Resources/WDR2011_Full_Text.pdf
[103] Lant Pritchett and Frauke de Weijer (2010), 'Fragile States: Stuck in a Capability Trap?' World Development Report 2011 Background Paper, available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9109/WDR2011_0001.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
[104] Jeremy Lind, Becky Mitchell, and Brigitte Rohwerder (2016), *Reducing Violence in a Time of Global Uncertainty: Insights from the Institute of Development Studies Addressing and Mitigating Violence Programme*. London: Institute of Development Studies, available at http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/123456789/11736/1/ER197_ReducingViolenceinaTimeofGlobalUncertaintyInsightsfromtheInstituteofDevelopmentStudiesAddressingandMitigatingViolenceProgramme.pdf
[105] Christopher Cramer, Jonathan Goodhand, Robert Morris, Helena Pérez-Niño, Benjamin Petrini and Joshua Rogers (2016), *Rapid Evidence Assessment for Conflict Prevention*. Reading: Coffey, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555756/effectiveness-conflict-prevention-interventions1.pdf

[106] Susanna Campbell, Achim Wennmann and Natasha White (2013), *Entry Points for a New Prevention Agenda: Connecting New York, Geneva and 'At-Risk' Contexts*. Geneva: Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, available at http://www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/Brief%2008%20-%20Entry%20points%20for%20a%20new%20prevention%20agenda%20-%20May%202013.pdf
[107] The Geneva Peacebuilding Platform (2015), *White Paper on Peacebuilding*. Geneva: Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, available at http://www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/White%20Paper%20on%20Peacebuilding.pdf
[108] Ian Bremmer (2016), 'Q&A with UN Secretary General Candidate Antonio Guterres,' *Time*, 20 July 2016, available at http://time.com/4415879/qa-with-un-secretary-general-candidate-antonio-guterres/
[109] United Nations (2016), 'Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2282 (2016) on Review of United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture,' available at http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12340.doc.htm
[110] Richard Carver and Lisa Handley (2016), *Does Torture Prevention Work?* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press
[111] Association for the Prevention of Torture (2016), *"Yes, Torture Prevention Works" - Insights from a global research study on 30 years of torture prevention*. Geneva: Association for the Prevention of Torture, available at http://www.apt.ch/content/files_res/apt-briefing-paper_yes-torture-prevention-works.pdf
[112] Association for the Prevention of Torture (2016), *"Yes, Torture Prevention Works" - Insights from a global research study on 30 years of torture prevention*. Geneva: Association for the Prevention of Torture, available at http://www.apt.ch/content/files_res/apt-briefing-paper_yes-torture-prevention-works.pdf
[113] Office of the High Commissioner United Nations Human Rights (2015), 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff,' available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Truth/A-HRC-30-42.pdf
[114] Richard Gowan, Lawrence Woocher, and Daniel Solomon (2016), *Preventing Mass Atrocities - An Essential Agenda for the Next UN-Secretary General*. Washington DC: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, available at https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/Preventing-mass-atrocities.pdf
[115] Department of Reproductive Health and Research (undated), *Female Genital Mutilation programmes to date: what works and what doesn't*. Geneva: WHO, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/75195/1/WHO_RHR_11.36_eng.pdf?ua=1
[116] International Labour Organization (2015), *World report on child labour 2015: Paving the way to decent work for young people*. Geneva: ILO, available at http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/download.do?type=document&id=26977
[117] Anju Malhotra, Ann Warner, Allison McGonagle, and Susan Lee-Rife (2011), *Solutions to End Child Marriage: What the Evidence Shows*. Washington DC: International Center on Research for Women, available at http://www.icrw.org/files/publications/Solutions-to-End-Child-Marriage.pdf
[118] Maria Krisch, Manuel Eisner, Christopher Mikton and Alexander Butchart (2015), *Global Strategies to Reduce Violence by 50% in 30 Years: Findings from the WHO and University of Cambridge Global Violence Reduction Conference 2014*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, available at http://www.vrc.crim.cam.ac.uk/VRCconferences/conference/violencereductionreport
[119] Maria Krisch, Manuel Eisner, Christopher Mikton and Alexander Butchart (2015), *Global Strategies to Reduce Violence by 50% in 30 Years: Findings from the WHO and University of Cambridge Global Violence Reduction Conference 2014*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, available at http://www.vrc.crim.cam.ac.uk/VRCconferences/conference/violencereductionreport
[120] Maria Krisch, Manuel Eisner, Christopher Mikton and Alexander Butchart (2015), *Global Strategies to Reduce Violence by 50% in 30 Years: Findings from the WHO and University of Cambridge Global Violence Reduction Conference 2014*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, available at http://www.vrc.crim.cam.ac.uk/VRCconferences/conference/violencereductionreport
[121] Instituto Igarapé (2015), *Where is Latin America? Reflections on Peace, Security, Justice and Governance in the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda*. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Igarapé, available at https://igarape.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/AE-17_Where-is-Latin-America-21-09.pdf [doc 372]
[122] World Health Organization (2014), *Global Status Report On Violence Prevention 2014*. Geneva: World Health Organization, available at http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/145086/1/9789241564793_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1
[123] World Health Organization (2016), 'Violence and Injury Prevention: Collaborating centres,' available at http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/about/collaborating_centres/en/

[124] Susanna Campbell, Achim Wennmann and Natasha White (2013), *Entry Points for a New Prevention Agenda: Connecting New York, Geneva and 'At-Risk' Contexts*. Geneva: Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, available at http://www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/Brief%2008%20-%20Entry%20points%20for%20a%20new%20prevention%20agenda%20-%20May%202013.pdf
[125] United Nations (2012), 'Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen the rule of law at the national and international levels Report of the Secretary-General,' available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/66/749
[126] Ramaswamy Sudarshan (undated), 'Rule of Law and Access to Justice: Perspectives from UNDP Experience,' available at https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/Rule%20of%20Law%20and%20Access%20to%20Justice_Perspectives%20from%20UNDP%20experience1.doc
[127] Note on data methodology - these initial scenarios are based on partially disaggregated data for average deaths for 2007-2012 and 2010-2015 from the Small Arms Survey's multi-source database on violent deaths. For the purposes of this calculation, it has been assumed that the country averages are directly comparable. However, the sources upon which the data estimates are based do vary in some cases. If the complete raw data set and metadata become available, the accuracy of these calculations will be improved, and the current predictions are likely to be subject to change.
[128] Economic and Social Council (2016), *World crime trends and emerging issues and responses in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice: Note by the Secretariat.* E/CN.15/2016/10, available at https://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/296526.812016964.html pp14-16
[129] United Nations (2015), *State of crime and criminal justice worldwide: Report of the Secretary-General*. New York: United Nations, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/ACONF222_4_e_V1500369.pdf; and UNODC (2016), 'Improving access to justice: extending the reach of sustainable development agenda,' available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Improving-access-to-justice_UNODC_IATF-Issue-Brief.pdf
[130] UNODC (2016), 'Improving access to justice: extending the reach of sustainable development agenda,' available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Improving-access-to-justice_UNODC_IATF-Issue-Brief.pdf
[131] UNODC (2016), 'Improving access to justice: extending the reach of sustainable development agenda,' available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Improving-access-to-justice_UNODC_IATF-Issue-Brief.pdf p4
[132] Fair Trials (2016), 'Our vision: A world where every person's right to a fair trial is respected,' available at https://www.fairtrials.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/160819_Fair-Trials_UN-2030-Agenda-for-Sustainable-Development.pdf
[133] Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and United Nations Development Programme (2008), *Making the Law Work for Everyone - Volume 1: Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor*. New York: Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and United Nations Development Programme, available at http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/Making_the_law_work_for_everyone.pdf
[134] Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and United Nations Development Programme (2008), *Making the Law Work for Everyone - Volume 1: Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor*. New York: Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and United Nations Development Programme, available at http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/Making_the_law_work_for_everyone.pdf
[135] Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and United Nations Development Programme (2008), *Making the Law Work for Everyone - Volume 1: Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor*. New York: Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and United Nations Development Programme, available at http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/Making_the_law_work_for_everyone.pdf
[136] Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and United Nations Development Programme (2008), *Making the Law Work for Everyone - Volume 1: Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor*. New York: Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and United Nations Development Programme, available at http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/Making_the_law_work_for_everyone.pdf p32
[137] Roderick B Mathews and Juan Carlos Botero (2010), 'Access to Justice in the United States - Findings from the Newly Released Rule of Law Index of the World Justice Project,' *Virginia Lawyer*, December 2010, Vol 59, pp24-25,

available at
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/486481access_to_justice_in_the_united_states_virginia_lawyer_12-10.pdf
[138] Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010), *The Worldwide Governance Indicators - Methodology and Analytical Issues*. Policy Research Working Paper 5430. Washington DC: The World Bank, available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/09_wgi_kaufmann.pdf
[139] Carla AbouZahr, Don de Savigny, Lene Mikkelsen, Philip W Setel, Rafael Lozano, Erin Nichols, Francis Notzon and Alan D Lopez (2015), 'Civil registration and vital statistics: progress in the data revolution for counting and accountability,' *The Lancet*, Vol. 386, No. 10001, p1373–1385, available at http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(15)60173-8.pdf [doc 73]; and United Nations Children's Fund (2013), *Every Child's Birth Right: Inequities and trends in birth registration*, New York: UNICEF, available at
http://data.unicef.org/corecode/uploads/document6/uploaded_pdfs/corecode/Birth_Registration_lores_final_24.pdf
[140] Lene Mikkelsen, David E Phillips, Carla AbouZahr, Philip W Setel, Don de Savigny, Rafael Lozano and Alan D Lopez, (2015), 'A global assessment of civil registration and vital statistics systems: monitoring data quality and progress,' *The Lancet*, Vol. 386, No. 10001, p1395–1406, available at http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736(15)60171-4.pdf [doc 75]; and United Nations Children's Fund (2013), *Every Child's Birth Right: Inequities and trends in birth registration*, New York: UNICEF, available at
http://data.unicef.org/corecode/uploads/document6/uploaded_pdfs/corecode/Birth_Registration_lores_final_24.pdf
[141] See: UNICEF global database on birth registration, available at http://data.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Birth_registration_May-2016.xlsx
[142] Dev Kar and Joseph Spanjers (2015), *Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2004-2013*. Washington DC: Global Financial Integrity, available at http://www.gfintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IFF-Update_2015-Final.pdf
[143] Global Financial Integrity (Undated), 'Illicit Financial Flows,' available at http://www.gfintegrity.org/issue/illicit-financial-flows/
[144] United Nations and World Bank (2007), *Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan*. Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, available at https://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Star-rep-full.pdf
[145] United Nations and World Bank (2007), *Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan*. Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, available at https://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Star-rep-full.pdf
[146] United Nations and World Bank (2007), *Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan*. Washington DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, available at https://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS/Resources/Star-rep-full.pdf p9
[147] UNODC (2011), *Estimating Illicit Financial Flows Resulting from Drug Trafficking and Other Transnational Organized Crimes - Research Report*. Vienna: UNODC, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_financial_flows_2011_web.pdf
[148] UN Stats (2016), 'SDG Indicators - Metadata 16.5.1,' available at
http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/files/Metadata-16-05-01.pdf
[149] Transparency International (2013), *Global Corruption Barometer 2013*. Berlin: Transparency International, available at
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/604/2549/file/2013_GlobalCorruptionBarometer_EN.pdf
[150] United Nations (2015), 'State of crime and criminal justice worldwide: Report of the Secretary-General,' New York: United Nations, available at https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/ACONF222_4_e_V1500369.pdf p17
[151] See: World Bank (2016), 'Enterprise Surveys - Corruption,' available at
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/data/exploretopics/corruption#--1

[152] Kelly McMann, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Jan Teorell, and Staffan I Lindberg (2016), 'Strategies of Validation: Assessing the Varieties of Democracy Corruption Data,' *Working Paper Series 2016:23*. Gothenberg: V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, available at https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/2a/7d/2a7d55e0-15c7-46e0-8a15-3a3f894ab12d/v-dem_working_paper_2016_23.pdf
[153] International Labour Office (2016), *Women at Work - Trends 2016*. Geneva: ILO, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_457317.pdf
[154] DeAnne Aguirre, Leila Hoteit, Christine Rupp, and Karim Sabbagh (2012), *Empowering the Third Billion: Women and the world of work in 2012*, New York: Strategy&, available at http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Strategyand_Empowering-the-Third-Billion_Full-Report.pdf
[155] International Labour Office (2016), *Women at Work - Trends 2016*. Geneva: ILO, available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_457317.pdf
[156] UN Stats (2016), 'SDG Indicators - Metadata 8.5.2,' available at http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/files/Metadata-08-05-02.pdf
[157] Eurostat (2015), 'Disability statistics – labour market access,' available at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Disability_statistics_-_labour_market_access
[158] International Trade Union Confederation (undated), *The 2015 ITUC Global Rights Index - The World's Worst Countries for Workers*. Brussels: ITUC, available at https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/survey_global_rights_index_2015_en.pdf
[159] Another index that assesses labor rights is the Center for Global Workers' Rights and the Global Labour University's 'Labour Rights Indicators', which assesses countries against 108 evaluation criteria, see Center for Global Workers' Rights (undated), 'Labour Rights Indicators – map,' available at http://labour-rights-indicators.la.psu.edu/. Currently only available for 2012, they are in the process of updating the index to facilitate trend analysis, see School of Labor & Employment Relations, Penn State College of The Liberal Arts (2016), 'Labour Rights Indicators, New Database!', available at http://lser.la.psu.edu/gwr/tur-indicators
[160] ITUC (undated), 'ITUC Global Rights Index 2016,' available at https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/emc_ituc_a4_english__workersrights_1.pdf
[161] International Trade Union Confederation (undated), *The 2016 ITUC Global Rights Index - The World's Worst Countries for Workers*. Brussels: ITUC, available at https://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/survey_ra_2016_eng.pdf
[162] See: Human Rights Scores, available at http://humanrightsscores.org/; and Christopher J Fariss (2014), 'Respect for Human Rights has Improved Over Time: Modeling the Changing Standard of Accountability,' *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 108, No. 2 May 2014, available at http://cfariss.com/documents/Fariss2014APSR.pdf
[163] European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009), *European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey - Main Results Report*. Vienna: EU FRA, available at http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/663-FRA-2011_EU_MIDIS_EN.pdf
[164] European Commission (2015), 'Eurobarometer on Discrimination 2015: General perceptions, opinions on policy measures and awareness of rights,' available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/factsheet_eurobarometer_fundamental_rights_2015.pdf
[165] European Commission (2015), 'Eurobarometer on Discrimination 2015: General perceptions, opinions on policy measures and awareness of rights,' available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-rights/files/factsheet_eurobarometer_fundamental_rights_2015.pdf
[166] United Nations Development Programme (2015), *Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development*. New York: UNDP, available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2015_human_development_report.pdf
[167] Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2016), 'Explore Monitoring Data,' available at http://effectivecooperation.org/monitoring-country-progress/explore-monitoring-data/
[168] OECD/UNDP (2015), *Making Development Co-operation More Effective: 2014 Progress Report*. Paris: OECD Publishing, available at http://effectivecooperation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/4314021e.pdf
[169] The World Bank (2016), 'Women, Business and the Law,' available at http://wbl.worldbank.org/

[170] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2016), *Global Education Monitoring Project - Education for people and planet: creating sustainable futures for all*. Paris: UNESCO, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002457/245752e.pdf
[171] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2016), *Global Education Monitoring Project - Education for people and planet: creating sustainable futures for all*. Paris: UNESCO, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002457/245752e.pdf
[172] Council of Europe (undated), 'Expert Meeting on "Assessment of progress in the area of citizenship and human rights education" (15 and 16 October),' available at https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000168049217a
[173] William Schulz, John Ainley, Julian Fraillon, David Kerr, Bruno Losito (2010), *ICCS 2009 International Report: Civic knowledge, attitudes, and engagement among lower secondary school students in 38 countries*. Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, available at http://www.iea.nl/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/Electronic_versions/ICCS_2009_International_Report.pdf
[174] United Nations (2016), *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. New York: United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E
[175] Open Society Foundations (2015), 'What Does Justice Have to Do with Overcoming Poverty?' available at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/what-does-justice-have-do-overcoming-poverty
[176] James A Goldston (2013), *New Rules for the Rule of Law*. New York: Open Society Initiative, available at https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/goldston-aba-ruleoflaw-04242013.pdf
[177] LexisNexis (undated), 'LexisNexis Rule of Law Impact Tracker,' available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/rule-of-law/measuring-the-rule-of-law.page
[178] Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and United Nations Development Programme (2008), *Making the Law Work for Everyone - Volume 1: Report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor*. New York: Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and United Nations Development Programme, available at http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/Making_the_law_work_for_everyone.pdf
[179] Vivek Maru (2010), 'Allies Unknown: Social Accountability and Legal Empowerment,' *Health and Human Rights in Practice*, Vol 12, No 1, available at http://namati.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Allies-Unknown.pdf
[180] Thomas Carothers (2003), 'Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad - The problem of knowledge,' *Carnegie Endowment Working Papers, no 34.* Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/wp34.pdf
[181] GDSRC (2016), *Safety, security and justice - topic guide*. Birmingham: GDSRC, available at http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/GSDRC_SSJ.pdf
[182] Department for International Development (2013), 'Policy Approach to Rule of Law,' available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/306396/policy-approach-rule-of-law.pdf
[183] Laura Alexander, Natalie Alm, Suntae Kim, Samantha Lara, Corina Rebegea and Ingrid Rojas (2013), *Literature Review of Impact Evaluations on Rule of Law and Governance Programming*. New York: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, available at http://www.3ieimpact.org/media/filer_public/2016/03/22/alexander_et_al_2013_-_rule_of_law.pdf. Seven case studies fell into the following categories – public order and criminal justice, and judicial system reform and access to justice.
[184] Lawrence W Sherman (2013), 'The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking,' available at http://cebcp.org/wp-content/evidence-based-policing/Sherman-TripleT.pdf
[185] Lorraine Mazerolle, Sarah Bennett, Jacqueline Davis, Elise Sargeant and Matthew Manning (2013), 'Legitimacy in Policing: A Systematic Review,' *Campbell Systematic Reviews* 2013:1 DOI: 10.4073/csr.2013.1, available at http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/download/2604/Mazerolle_Legitimacy_Review.pdf
[186] David Weisburd, Cody W Telep, Joshua C Hinkle and John E Eck (2008), 'The Effects of Problem Oriented Policing on Crime and Disorder,' *Campbell Systematic Reviews* 2008:14, available at http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/lib/download/228/
[187] Lawrence W Sherman (2013), 'The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing: Targeting, Testing, and Tracking,' available at http://cebcp.org/wp-content/evidence-based-policing/Sherman-TripleT.pdf

[188] Laura Goodwin and Vivek Maru (2014), *What do we know about legal empowerment? Mapping the Evidence*. Washington DC: Namati, available at http://namati.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Evidence-Review2.pdf
[189] The Law & Development Partnership (2016), *Developing a portfolio of financially sustainable, scalable basic legal service models - Briefing paper*. London: The Law & Development Partnership, available at http://www.lawdevelopment.com/BLS%20briefing%20paper.pdf
[190] David Steven (2016), 'Mapping SDG16+ - The Indicators for Peaceful, Just and Inclusive Societies: Draft Discussion Paper,' Center on International Cooperation, New York University
[191] See: ID2020, available at http://www.id2020summit.org/
[192] High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa (undated), *Track it! Stop it! Get it! Illicit Financial Flows*, Addis Ababa: High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows from Africa, available at http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf
[193] Quentin Reed and Alessandra Fontana (2011), *Corruption and illicit financial flows: The limits and possibilities of current approaches.* Bergen: Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, available at http://www.u4.no/assets/publications/3935-corruption-and-illicit-financial-flows.pdf
[194] Quentin Reed and Alessandra Fontana (2011), *Corruption and illicit financial flows: The limits and possibilities of current approaches.* Bergen: Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, available at http://www.u4.no/assets/publications/3935-corruption-and-illicit-financial-flows.pdf
[195] UK Government (2016), 'Anti-corruption Summit London 2016 – Communiqué' available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/522791/FINAL_-_AC_Summit_Communique_-_May_2016.pdf
[196] UNODC and OECD (2016), 'Coherent policies for combatting Illicit Financial Flows,' available at http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Coherent-policies-for-combatting-Illicit-Financial-Flows_UNODC-OECD_IATF-Issue-Brief.pdf
[197] World Bank Group (2016), *The World Bank Group's Response to Illicit Financial Flows: A Stocktaking*. Washington DC: World Bank, available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/502341468179035132/pdf/104568-BR-SecM2016-0112-IDASecM2016-0071-IFC-SecM2016-00423-MIGA-SecM2016-0044-Box394878B-PUBLIC-disclosed-4-5-16.pdf
[198] Peter Reuter (eds) (2012), *Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries*. Washington DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/International Development Association or The World Bank, available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2242/668150PUB0EPI0067848B09780821388693.pdf
[199] OECD (2014), *Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: Measuring OECD Responses*. Paris: OECD, available at https://www.oecd.org/corruption/Illicit_Financial_Flows_from_Developing_Countries.pdf
[200] Quentin Reed and Alessandra Fontana (2011), *Corruption and illicit financial flows: The limits and possibilities of current approaches.* Bergen: Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, available at http://www.u4.no/assets/publications/3935-corruption-and-illicit-financial-flows.pdf
[201] Quentin Reed and Alessandra Fontana (2011), *Corruption and illicit financial flows: The limits and possibilities of current approaches*. Bergen: Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, available at http://www.u4.no/assets/publications/3935-corruption-and-illicit-financial-flows.pdf
[202] Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna and Sendhil Mullainathan (2012), 'Corruption,' *Working Paper 12-08*, Cambridge MA: Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, available at http://economics.mit.edu/files/6607
[203] Rema Hanna, Sarah Bishop, Sara Nadel, Gabe Scheffler and Katherine Durlacher (2011), *The effectiveness of anti-corruption policy: What has worked, what hasn't, and what we don't know*. Technical report. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London, available at http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/SystematicReviews/Anti_corruption_2011Hanna.pdf
[204] Jesper Johnsøn, Nils Taxell and Dominik Zaum (2012), *Mapping evidence gaps in anti-corruption: Assessing the state of the operationally relevant evidence on donors' actions and approaches to reducing corruption*. Bergen: Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, available at http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/U4/U4Issue-2012-07-mapping-evidence-web.pdf

[205] Office of the High Commissioner United Nations Human Rights (2016), 'A Human Rights-Based Approach to Data: Leaving No One Behind in the 2030 Development Agenda - Guidance Note to Data Collection and Disaggregation,' available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/HRIndicators/GuidanceNoteonApproachtoData.pdf
[206] Human Rights Council (2011), 'Discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,' available at http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/discrimination/a.hrc.19.41_english.pdf
[207] OHCHR (2012), 'Committee on the Rights of the Child – Report of the 2012 Day of General Discussion: The rights of all children in the context of international migration,' available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRC/Discussions/2012/DGD2012ReportAndRecommendations.pdf
[208] The Inter-Agency Working Group to End Child Immigration Detention (2016), 'Exploring a Global Initiative to End Child Immigration Detention – Discussion Paper.'
[209] UN Women (undated), 'Member State commitments,' available at http://www.unwomen.org/en/get-involved/step-it-up/commitments
[210] UN Women (undated), 'Member State commitments,' available at http://www.unwomen.org/en/get-involved/step-it-up/commitments
[211] Marleen Dekker (2013), 'Promoting Gender Equality and Female Empowerment: A systematic review of the evidence on property rights, labour markets, political participation and violence against women,' *ASC Working Paper 111 / 2013*. Leiden: African Studies Centre, available at https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/21859/ASC-075287668-3276-01.pdf?sequence=2
[212] World Bank (2011), *World Development Report 2012 - Gender Equality and Development*. Washington DC: World Bank, available at http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTWDRS/EXTWDR2012/0,,contentMDK:23004468~pagePK:64167689~piPK:64167673~theSitePK:7778063,00.html
[213] The Law & Development Partnership (2016), *Developing a portfolio of financially sustainable, scalable basic legal service models - Briefing paper*. London: The Law & Development Partnership, available at http://www.lawdevelopment.com/BLS%20briefing%20paper.pdf
[214] See: ID2020 – Partnership, available at http://id2020.org/partnership/
[215] G20 (undated), 'G20 Action Plan on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development' available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000185879.pdf
[216] Quentin Reed and Alessandra Fontana (2011), *Corruption and illicit financial flows: The limits and possibilities of current approaches.* Bergen: Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, available at http://www.u4.no/assets/publications/3935-corruption-and-illicit-financial-flows.pdf
[217] United Nations (2015), *Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.* New York: United Nations, available at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld/publication
[218] Note on data methodology - these initial scenarios are based on partially disaggregated data for average deaths for 2007-2012 and 2010-2015 from the Small Arms Survey's multi-source database on violent deaths. For the purposes of this calculation, it has been assumed that the country averages are directly comparable. However, the sources upon which the data estimates are based do vary in some cases. If the complete raw data set and metadata become available, the accuracy of these calculations will be improved, and the current predictions are likely to be subject to change.
[219] PEFA (2016), 'Countries & Regions,' available at https://pefa.org/countries-regions#/
[220] UN Stats (2016), 'SDG Indicators - Metadata 16.6.1,' available at http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/files/Metadata-16-06-01.pdf
[221] PEFA (2016), 'Countries & Regions,' available at https://pefa.org/countries-regions#/
[222] SDG16 Data Initiative (undated), '*16.6.1 Primary government expenditures as a proportion of original approved budget, by sector (or by budget code or something similar)',* available at http://www.sdg16.org/map/?layer=primary_government_expenditures&layerType=indicator
[223] UN Stats (2016), 'Goal 16 Compilation of Metadata for the Proposed Global Indicators for the Review of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,' available at http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/metadata-compilation/Metadata-Goal-16.pdf

[224] Global data provided by GALLUP, "In the city or area where you live, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the educational system or the schools?"
[225] Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2010), 'The Worldwide Governance Indicators - Methodology and Analytical Issues,' *Policy Research Working Paper 5430*. Washington DC: The World Bank, available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5430
[226] Lant Pritchett and Frauke de Weijer (2010), 'Fragile States: Stuck in a Capability Trap?' World Development Report 2011 Background Paper, available at https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/9109/WDR2011_0001.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
[227] OECD (2015), *States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions.* Paris: OECD Publishing, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264227699-en
[228] UN Stats (2016), 'Goal 17 Compilation of Metadata for the Proposed Global Indicators for the Review of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,' available at http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/files/metadata-compilation/Metadata-Goal-17.pdf
[229] OECD (2016), 'Revenue Statistics – tax ratio changes between 1965 and 2013,' available at https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/revenue-statistics-ratio-change-all-years.htm
[230] Marc Helbling, Liv Bjerre, Friederike Römer, and Malisa Zobel (2013), 'The Immigration Policies in Comparison (IMPIC) Index: The Importance of a Sound Conceptualization,' *Migration and Citizenship*, Vol 1, No 2, available at http://www.marc-helbling.ch/wp-content/uploads/test/impicconceptualization.pd; and Migration and Citizenship (2013), 'Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Migration and Citizenship,' available at http://www.marc-helbling.ch/wp-content/uploads/test/migcit-newsletter-vol1-2_summer-2013.pdf; and Frank Laczko (2015), 'Migration Indicators and the post-2015 SDGs,' available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/statcom/statcom_2015/seminars/migration/docs/IOM.pdf
[231] Center for Global Development (undated), 'The Commitment to Development Index,' available at http://www.cgdev.org/cdi-2015
[232] Migrant Integration Policy Index (2015), ''What is MIPEX?' available at http://www.mipex.eu/what-is-mipex
[233] Migrant Integration Policy Index (2015), 'International Key Findings,' available at http://www.mipex.eu/key-findings
[234] The Economist Intelligence Unit (2016), *Measuring well-governed migration - The 2016 Migration Governance Index*. London: The Economist, available at http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_governance_index_2016.pdf
[235] International Monetary Fund (2016), *Global Financial Stability Report - Fostering Stability in a Low-Growth, Low-Rate Era*. Washington DC: The International Monetary Fund, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2016/02/pdf/text.pdf
[236] International Monetary Fund (2015), 'Financial Soundness Indicators and the IMF,' available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/fsi/eng/fsi.htm
[237] International Monetary Fund (2016), 'IMF Data Access to Macroeconomic and Financial Data – Financial Soundness Indicators,' available at http://data.imf.org/?sk=9F855EAE-C765-405E-9C9A-A9DC2C1FEE47
[238] UN Stats (2016), 'SDG Indicators Global Database – 10.6.1,' available at http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/?indicator=10.6.1
[239] UN Stats (2016), 'SDG Indicators Global Database – 17.10.1,' available at http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/?indicator=17.10.1
[240] UNCTAD (2013), *Key Statistics and Trends in Trade Policy*. New York and Geneva: United Nations, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab20132_en.pdf
[241] UNCTAD (2015), *Key Statistics and Trends in Trade Policy 2015 - Preferential Trade Agreements*. New York and Geneva: United Nations, available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab2015d2_en.pdf
[242] Gina Bergh, Alina Rocha Menochal and Laura Rodriguez Takeuchi (2014), *What's behind the demand for governance? An assessment of people's views.* London: Overseas Development Institute, available at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8837.pdf
[243] OECD (2016), 'Poverty rate,' available at https://data.oecd.org/inequality/poverty-rate.htm (accessed on 04 November 2016)

[244] OCED (2016), *OECD Factbook 2015-2016: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics.* Paris: OECD Publishing, available at http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-factbook-2015-2016_factbook-2015-en;jsessionid=3mamqwc99uhsc.x-oecd-live-03
[245] The World Bank (2016), 'Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population), available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC
[246] UN Stats (2016), 'SDG Indicators Global Database – 5.5.1,' available at http://unstats.un.org/sdgs/indicators/database/?indicator=5.5.1
[247] International Labour Organization (2011), 'Statistics and database - Databases and Subjects,' available at http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/help_home/data_by_subject?_adf.ctrl-state=1c5ut1xun2_649&_afrLoop=119677189030470#!
[248] UNESCO (2014), *World Trends in Freedom of Expression and Media Development*. Paris: UNESCO, available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002270/227025e.pdf
[249] UNESCO and the International Programme for the Development of Communication (undated), *Time to Break the Cycle of Violence Against Journalists - Highlights from the UNESCO Director-General's 2016 Report on the Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity*. Paris: UNESCO, available at http://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/unesco_report_rgb_english.pdf
[250] United Nations (2016), *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. New York: United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E
[251] United Nations (2016), *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development*. New York: United Nations, available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E
[252] OECD (2015), *States of Fragility 2015: Meeting Post-2015 Ambitions.* Paris: OECD Publishing, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264227699-en
[253] Alex Evans, Bruce Jones and David Steven (2010), *Confronting the Long Crisis of Globalization: Risk, Resilience and International Order*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2010/1/26-globalization-jones/01_globalization_evans_jones_steven.pdf
[254] Alex Evans, Bruce Jones and David Steven (2010), *Confronting the Long Crisis of Globalization: Risk, Resilience and International Order*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2010/1/26-globalization-jones/01_globalization_evans_jones_steven.pdf
[255] Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock and Matt Andrews (2010), 'Capability Traps? The Mechanisms of Persistent Implementation Failure,' available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/fs/lpritch/Governance/capability_traps(june2010).pdf
[256] Aseem Prakash and Matthew Potoski (eds) (2014), 'Dysfunctional Institutions? Towards a New Agenda in Governance Studies,' available at https://faculty.washington.edu/aseem/R&G.pdf
[257] Alina Rochal Menocal and Leni Wild (2013), 'The relationship between governance and progress: Why the UN High-Level Panel places governance at the heart of the post-2015 framework,' in *Global Development Goals - Leaving no one behind*. London: UNA-UK, available at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8732.pdf
[258] Alina Rochal Menocal and Leni Wild (2013), 'The relationship between governance and progress: Why the UN High-Level Panel places governance at the heart of the post-2015 framework,' in *Global Development Goals - Leaving no one behind*. London: UNA-UK, available at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/8732.pdf
[259] Matt Andrews (2011), 'Governance reform results are as reliable as a coin toss,' 14 June 2011, available at http://matthewandrews.typepad.com/mattandrews/2011/06/governance-reform-results-are-as-reliable-as-a-coin-toss.html
[260] Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock (2012), 'Escaping Capability Traps through Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA),' *CGD Working Paper 299*. Washington DC: Center for Global Development, available at http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1426292_file_Andrews_Pritchett_Woolcock_traps_FINAL_0.pdf
[261] Dani Rodrik (2004), 'Getting Institutions Right,' available at https://www.sss.ias.edu/files/pdfs/Rodrik/Research/getting-institutions-right.pdf

[262] Merilee S Grindle (2007), 'Good Enough Governance Revisited,' *Development Policy Review*, 2007, 25 (5): 553-574, available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-7679.2007.00385.x/epdf
[263] Alan Hudson (2013), 'Cookie cutters and context: The limits of institutional reform in development,' 27 February 2013, available at https://www.one.org/us/2013/02/27/cookie-cutters-and-context-the-limits-of-institutional-reform-in-development/
[264] Sue Unsworth (2015), *It's the politics! Can donors rise to the challenge?* Paris: OECD, available at https://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/governance/docs/Governance%20Notebook%201.2%20Unsworth.pdf
[265] World Bank Open Government Global Solutions Group (2016), *Open Government Impact & Outcomes - Mapping the Landscape of Ongoing Research*. Washington DC: World Bank, available at http://opengovimpact.org/img/og-impact-full-report.pdf
[266] Brandon Brockmyer and Jonathan Fox (2015), *Assessing the Evidence: The Effectiveness and Impact of Public Governance-Oriented Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives.* London: Transparency & Accountability Initiative, available at http://transparencyinitiative.theideabureau.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Assessing-the-Evidence-MSIs.pdf
[267] Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock (2012), 'Escaping Capability Traps through Problem-Driven Iterative Adaptation (PDIA),' *CGD Working Paper 299*. Washington DC: Center for Global Development, available at http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/1426292_file_Andrews_Pritchett_Woolcock_traps_FINAL_0.pdf
[268] Doing Development Differently (undated), 'The Manifesto,' available at http://doingdevelopmentdifferently.com/the-ddd-manifesto/
[269] MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Opening Governance (2015), 'Toward a Research Agenda on Opening Governance,' available at https://medium.com/@opengovnet/toward-a-research-agenda-on-opening-governance-a6d451b398e
[270] Luis Guillermo Solis Rivera (2015), 'Open Government, A Catalyst for Democracy,' 20 November 2015, available at http://www.opengovpartnership.org/blog/blog-editor/2015/11/20/open-government-catalyst-democracy
[271] MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Opening Governance (2015), 'A New Paradigm: Opening Governance,' available https://medium.com/@opengovnet/toward-a-research-agenda-on-opening-governance-a6d451b398e
[272] Ruth Puttick, Peter Baeck and Philip Colligan (2014), *The teams and funds making innovation happen in governments around the world*. London: NESTA, available at http://www.nesta.org.uk/sites/default/files/i-teams_june_2014.pdf
[273] Matt Andrews, Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock (2015), 'Doing Problem Driven Work,' *CID Working Paper No. 307 December 2015*. Cambridge MA: Center for International Development, Harvard University, available at http://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/files/bsc/files/doing_problem_driven_work_wp_307.pdf
[274] World Bank Open Government Global Solutions Group (2016), *Open Government Impact & Outcomes - Mapping the Landscape of Ongoing Research*. Washington DC: World Bank, available at http://opengovimpact.org/img/og-impact-full-report.pdf
[275] The World Bank (2016), 'Launch of the Research Consortium on the Impact of Open Government,' 8 February 2016, available at http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/launch-of-research-consortium-on-the-impact-of-open-government-processes
[276] United Nations (2016), 'New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,' available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/71/L.1
[277] Cindy Huang and Nazanin Ash (2016), Refugee Compacts: An Initial Framework. Washington DC: Center for Global Development, available at http://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/refugee-compacts-initial-framework.pdf
[278] David McKenzie and Dean Yang (2014), *Evidence on Policies to Increase the Development Impacts of International Migration*. KNOMAD Working Paper 2. Washington DC: KNOMAD, available at http://www.knomad.org/docs/working_papers/KNOMAD%20Working%20Paper%202_McKenzie-Yang_12-19-2014.pdf
[279] Pilar Domingo, Rebecca Holmes, Tam O'Neil, Nicola Jones, Kate Bird, Anna Larson, Elizabeth Presler-Marshall and Craig Valters (2015), *Women's voice and leadership in decision-making - Assessing the evidence*. London:

Overseas Development Institute, available at https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9627.pdf

[280] Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2014), *Women's leadership: evidence review*. Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, available https://dfat.gov.au/aid/how-we-measure-performance/ode/Documents/evidence-review-womens-leadership.pdf

[281] Open Government Partnership (undated), 'Joint Declaration on Open Government for the Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,' available at http://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/attachments/OGP_declaration.pdf

[282] The Law & Development Partnership (2016), *Developing a portfolio of financially sustainable, scalable basic legal service models - Briefing paper*. London: The Law & Development Partnership, available at http://www.lawdevelopment.com/BLS%20briefing%20paper.pdf

[283] Every Woman Every Child (2015), 'Shaping the Future for Healthy Women, Children & Adolescents: Learn More About the Process to Update the Global Strategy,' available at http://www.everywomaneverychild.org/global-strategy-2

[284] M Shekar, J Kakietek, M D'Alimonte, D Walters, H Rogers, J Dayton Eberwein, S Soe-Lin, and R Hecht (undated), 'Investing in Nutrition – the Foundation for Development,' available at http://thousanddays.org/tdays-content/uploads/Investing-in-Nutrition-The-Foundation-for-Development.pdf

[285] United Nations (2015), 'Adoption of the Paris Agreement – Proposal by the President, Draft Decision -/CP.21,' available at http://www.cop21.gouv.fr/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/l09.pdf